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1. RESEARCH IN CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT
1.1. Historical background
Je a n  P iag e t was the first researcher who studied conceptual developm ent by 
using the m ethodology that is acceptable today. His theory has had a trem en­
dous impact on the developm ent o f  the discipline. According to Piaget, the 
thinking o f  a child is different from the formal operational thinking o f  an adult. 
An individual constructs cognitive representations, which are dependent on his 
or her level o f  the development, by means o f  two complementary psychological 
mechanisms —  assim ilation and accommodation (1948, 1976). So, he stressed 
the internal activity o f  a child, formulating the idea in the expression: “To un­
derstand is to invent” (1973). Activity means internal manipulation o f  objects, 
meanings come from actions that the child performs on these objects, rather 
than from the objects them selves (1970). He differentiated between spontane­
ous and non-spontaneous concepts but was interested mainly in the develop­
ment o f  spontaneous concepts, which truly reflect the characteristics o f  the 
child’s mind (1948). Non-spontaneous concepts reflect the m astering o f  cul­
tural knowledge being taken by a child from adults in a ready-made form. 
Piaget argued that social life is necessary for an individual to overcome ego­
centrism, to internalize societal norms and rules, and to develop self- 
consciousness. Cooperation between peers, which is a source o f  criticism, leads 
to autonomy; discussions give rise to reflection and objective verification. He 
saw the role o f  an adult mainly as a collaborator rather than that o f  a m aster 
(1932).
Piaget argued against traditional individualistic teacher-centered education, 
which prepares children for examinations rather than for life (1932). His theory 
has had an im pact on child-centered progressive education, and at present it is 
enjoying even greater popularity (see below). First, constructivism as an edu­
cational ideology is based on his idea about the importance o f child’s own ex­
perim entation (1932, 1970, 1973). Second, group work as a w idespread teach­
ing method makes use o f  P iaget’s ideas about the importance o f  collaboration 
between peers (1932).
Lev V ygotsky stressed more than Piaget the importance o f  society and cul­
tural norms for children’s conceptual development (1935). Children are accul- 
turated into the society ju s t through collaborating with more experienced per­
sons, adults or peers. D ifferent cultural tools or mediational means, for exam­
ple, language, models, maps, and schemes that children have to m aster play a 
vital role in their mental development. The knowledge mediated by such signs 
as words, w riting systems, schemata, diagrams, and maps is especially impor­
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tant because o f  its leading role in the development o f higher psychological 
functions (1982a; 1994a).
M ore than Piaget, Vygotsky dealt w ith the impact o f formal school educa­
tion on children’s development. In school, children have to m aster written lan­
guage and scientific knowledge, solve problems different from everyday ones, 
and reflect on their thinking. This is why Vygotsky distinguished between sci­
entific and everyday concepts (1982b, 1994b). Everyday concepts are mastered 
by being in direct contact w ith their references, or observing the corresponding 
phenomena, whereas scientific concepts are learned in school by verbal expla­
nations. P a p e r  I  gives an overview o f the characteristic features, differences in 
formation and development, strengths and weaknesses o f  scientific and every­
day concepts. These problems are also discussed in P a p e r  I I I  and P a p e r  V. 
The characteristics o f  child’s thinking (e.g., pre-operational thinking level ac­
cording to Piaget) follow from the fact that everyday concepts do not form a 
system, therefore the relationship between concepts reflects the relations be­
tween objects. D ifferently from Piaget, Vygotsky argued that scientific or non- 
spontaneous concepts are not acquired in a ready-made form, but their devel­
opment is a time-consum ing and complicated thinking process. When a child 
first hears a new  word (e.g., in the form o f  a definition), its development is 
starting and not ending. Scientific concepts belong to a special system and are 
co-constructed by a student together with a teacher. This systematicity and co­
operation helps a child to start to reflect on his or her own thinking and over­
come the peculiarities o f  child’s thinking.
Vygotsky, like Piaget, argued against traditional teacher-centered education. 
He warned against verbalisms in teaching, which may lead to a situation where 
children do not acquire concepts but words, relying mainly on their memory 
and not on thinking, therefore not being able to use their knowledge. He also 
emphasized the need for students to learn from their own activities. Students’ 
role in school should not be reduced to the passive receptacle o f  knowledge. He 
wrote that children’s thinking emerges in the context o f  dispute (1983), i.e., 
from cooperation and group work in school.
But more than the role o f peers he stressed the role o f teachers who interme­
diate society’s scientific knowledge to students. He considered the asymmetric 
relationship in the cooperation between a developing child and his social envi­
ronm ent to be the norm ative case, and saw a danger for the development if 
children cannot collaborate with adults and/or more experienced peers. These 
conclusions derive from the general genetic law o f cultural development: “The 
higher psychological functions emerge first in the collective behavior o f  the 
child, in the form o f  cooperation with others, and only subsequently become 
internalized as the child’s internal functions” (Vygotsky, 1983, p. 197). W hat a 
child and a teacher do together at first (e.g., talk about the ways o f  solving a 
problem), a child will do alone afterwards as the process will have been inter­
nalized by a child.
The concept o f  the zone o f proxim al development (ZPD) may be used to ex­
plicate the process o f  learning and development. ZPD is “the distance between 
the actual developm ental level as determined by independent problem solving 
and the level o f  potential developm ent as determined through problem solving 
under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers” (1978, 
p. 86). Potential developm ent becomes actual development through internaliza­
tion. W hat a child can do in cooperation today, he can do alone tomorrow. An 
essential aspect o f  this interaction on ZPD is that less capable participants can 
participate in forms o f  interaction that are beyond their competence when act­
ing alone. Ideal teaching should occur in ZPD and lead the development o f  a 
student.
1.2. Contemporary approaches
1.2.1. Heterogeneity of thinking
Traditional developm ental theories have been criticized mainly on two grounds 
(e.g., Fodor, 1972):
1. The w rong view o f  adult concepts, consequently, children would be de­
veloping to a fictional final state. It is a “classical view” in which meanings o f 
concepts can be described by lists o f  necessary and sufficient features (Smith & 
M edin, 1981). This view has been challenged on both empirical and theoretical 
grounds (e.g., Rosch & M ervis, 1975; Smith & M edin, 1981). Still, this view 
holds true for several subclasses o f  concepts including those used in scientific 
disciplines where exact usage o f  concepts is necessary (e.g., Tulviste, 1991).
2. I f  the shift in developm ent is qualitative, children and adults have differ­
ent kinds o f concepts. Accordingly, they would be expected to misunderstand 
each other. For some reason, however, this total misunderstanding does not oc­
cur.
The cognitive revolution and the advent o f  sociocultural approaches has 
been accompanied by an emphasis on heterogeneity o f  thinking, which makes it 
possible to overcome the difficulties o f  traditional theories. The concept o f  het­
erogeneity is interpreted differently by different researchers.
P e e te r  T ulv iste  (1991) argues that each person possesses different types o f 
thinking and relates the heterogeneity o f  thinking types to the heterogeneity o f 
activities. Scientific thinking, characterized by logical argumentation and well- 
defined conceptual systems arises in school and is used for solving school (and 
afterwards, scientific) problems. As adults participate in other forms o f  activi­
ties besides scientific ones, the “older” types o f thinking that correspond to 
them are preserved and continue to function. So, scientific thinking does not 
replace other types o f  thinking but arises beside them. An adult person uses 
different types o f  thinking to solve different types o f problems. Children pos-
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sess fewer types o f  thinking than adults, but mutual understanding is possible as 
some types o f  thinking coincide. Thinking develops as children participate in 
new culturally accepted activities.
Jam es W ertsch  (1991) elaborates the Vygotskian idea o f cultural tools 
(such “m ediational m eans” as language) as important determinants o f  develop­
ment. He stresses that language functions differently in different sociocultural 
settings and makes use o f  Bakhtin’s concepts o f social languages and speech 
genres (Bahtin, 1987). Socialization involves mastering the rules for using par­
ticular speech genres in particular settings. A specific speech genre —  the lan­
guage o f  “official science” (or speech genre o f  formal instruction) —  occupies 
a privileged position in school. But the development o f a new speech genre 
(e.g., formal instruction) does not result in the disappearance o f others. The 
theoretical problem s o f  heterogeneity o f  thinking and speaking are discussed in 
P a p e r  II .
Similar ideas o f  privileging are also expressed by the “literate register” 
(W atson, 1985; Snow, 1990) or “talking science” (Lemke, 1990; Howe, Tol- 
mie & Rodgers, 1992). However, some authors write mainly about talking  in a 
new genre, not so much about thinking or understanding. For example, Lemke 
writes: “Classroom  language is not ju st a list o f  technical terms, or even ju st a 
recital o f  definitions. It is the use o f  those terms in relation to one another, 
across a wide variety o f  contexts. Students have to learn how to combine the 
meanings o f  different terms according to the accepted ways o f  talking science .” 
(1990, p. 12, my italics). W hile according to Tulviste (1991), students acquire a 
new type o f  thinking to be able to solve new types o f  problems, the question o f 
why the genre o f  official science is privileged in school remains unanswered in 
Lem ke’s work. M oreover, I would argue that combining the meanings o f terms 
according to the accepted ways o f  talking is not the same as understanding sci­
entific discourse and thinking scientifically. Students learn to combine mean­
ings and use scientific explanations very easily but it is not the same as thinking 
scientifically and/or understanding the phenomena in the way scientists do 
(cf. below parrotlike repetition; Vygotsky, 1994c). The study described in P a ­
p e r V  shows it quite well.
Em pirical studies have documented the differences in thinking in different 
societies, sociocultural settings and during solving different problems (e.g., Ro- 
goff & Lave, 1984; Cole, 1985; Tharp & Gallimore, 1988; Rogoff, 1990). In 
addition, it has been shown that lay adults use everyday thinking while arguing 
about physical, biological, psychological etc. phenomena, even if  they have 
been taught scientific explanations in school. They possess naive theories 
(everyday science, intuitive science) which differ from contemporary scientific 
theories even after formal teaching in school (McCloskey, 1983; Driver, 1990; 
Lewis, & Linn, 1994; Byrnes & Tomey-Purta, 1995; W egener & Petty, 1995). 
These results are in accordance with Tulviste’s approach, which tells that if 
there is no need in one’s later life to solve scientific problems, the ability o f
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scientific thinking may decline (also Luria, 1976; Rabinovitz & M andler, 
1983).
1.2.2. Young children’s naive theories
Recent research has also shown, however, that young children have significant 
im plicit understanding o f  the principles that are important for understanding in 
such domains as m athematics and science (Carey, 1985; W ellman & Estes, 
1986; Keil, 1989; Resnick, 1989). Also, pre-school children have quite an ex­
tensive knowledge in a variety o f  domains that is not as fragmented as it was 
thought before but compromised into theories (called naive or intuitive theories, 
mental m odels) (Carey, 1985; Driver, Guesne & Tiberghien, 1985; Neisser, 
1987; Ruble, Newman, Rholes & Altshuler, 1988; Keil, 1989; Inagaki, 1990; 
Chi & Slotta, 1993; Hatano & Inagaki, 1994; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994). It 
has been argued that these principles and theories are derived from children’s 
everyday sensory experiences and they enable children to interpret the phenom­
ena, make sense o f  the world and solve problems (Carey, 1985; Greeno, 1989; 
Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994; Driver, Squires, Rushworth & W ood-Robinson,
1995). C hildren’s personal knowledge varies to a degree that is consistent with 
scientific knowledge (Glynn & Duit, 1995).
These results provide evidence that children should not be considered as 
mere receptacles for receiving knowledge when they learn in school. Naive 
models influence the acquisition o f  new knowledge. Instead o f  acquiring new 
concepts, students should elaborate, modify and reorganize their initial con­
cepts. In fact, it has appeared that children’s models are very difficult to change 
by teaching, especially if  they differ essentially from scientific explanations, 
and, therefore, radical restructuring o f  knowledge is inevitable (Driver, 
Guesne & Tiberghien, 1985; Neisser, 1987; Vosniadou, 1992; Chi, Slotta & 
Leeuw, 1994; V osniadou & Brewer, 1994). Students learn from school the 
knowledge that does not contradict their everyday models. They also form 
synthetic models (sometimes called misconceptions), which are compromises 
between everyday beliefs and school knowledge (Vosniadou, 1992). Sometimes 
they acquire scientific concepts verbally (mere verbalisms according to Vygot­
sky), and fail to integrate them  later w ith everyday models. An overview o f  re­
search on children’s astronom ical concepts and their development is given in 
P a p e r  I I I ,  P a p e r  IV  and P a p e r  V.
So far, cognitive scientists have paid little attention to the ways new knowl­
edge is taught in school, and to why knowledge restructuring had not taken 
place during learning. They have not studied the discourse o f  textbooks and 
lessons, but these problem s have been studied by educational psychologists.
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2. RESEARCH IN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
2.1. Traditional education
Behaviorism was the paradigm behind traditional educational psychology be­
ginning with Edward L. Thorndike until at least the 1970s. Although the cogni­
tive revolution had an impact on educational psychology, changing the point o f 
interest towards the cognitive and motivational development o f  an individual, 
the differences between in- and out-of-school education etc., behavioral theo­
ries o f  learning are dom inant even in several new textbooks, including the one 
translated into Estonian (Lindgren & Suter, 1994). In general, schools are quite 
resistant to change, behavioral ideology being still quite persistent there.
Students are only passive recipients not active knowledge builders in the 
traditional classrooms, where the instructional mode o f lecture, question and 
answer is w idely used. Learning is identified with “ju st listening” . The typical 
structure o f  classroom  discourse (the interactional sequences mostly used in 
classrooms) is the following: teacher’s initiation —  student’s reply —  teacher’s 
evaluation (IRE sequence) (Mehan, 1979). Teachers deliver facts and explana­
tions, and the students’ task is to memorize them in order to know the answer to 
the evaluative questions (Glynn & Duit, 1995; Glynn, Yeany & Britton, 1991). 
These are the methods against which Vygotsky warned: “Direct teaching o f 
concepts is impossible and fruitless. A teacher who tries to do this usually ac­
complishes nothing but empty verbalism, a parrotlike repetition o f  words by a 
child, sim ulating a knowledge o f  the corresponding concepts but actually cov­
ering up a vacuum ” (1994c, p. 150).
It has been shown that traditional school books and teaching give such new 
information (facts, definitions, explanations) that does not take into account 
students’ previous (naive) conceptions (M ichaels & Bruce, 1989; Renner, 
Abraham & Grzybowsky, 1990; Pizzini, Shepardson & Abell, 1992; Driscoll, 
M oallem, Dick, & Kirby, 1994: M cNeal, 1995; Stinner, 1995). This new 
knowledge could remain quite far-fetched and abstract and is not integrated 
with the ch ild’s everyday knowledge.
These practices have been and still are characteristic o f Estonian mainstream 
education. One compulsory curriculum for all schools, big class sizes, no time 
for individual work, teaching directed toward an “average child”, based mainly 
on memorization, teachers unprepared for working with children’s special 
needs, their poor knowledge o f  alternative teaching methods and psychology —  
these are the realities o f  our school even today (e.g., Leuhin, 1996; Sokk,
1996). Our school leaders are proud o f our students’ good (factual) knowledge, 
students are considered to be “blank sheets o f  paper” who should be filled with
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school knowledge. Unfortunately, such perceptions are very far from the truth. 
This type o f  lessons are described in P a p e r  III .
2.2. Alternative education
Alternative ideology in education, described as progressive (as opposed to tra­
ditional) and child-centered (as opposed to teacher-centered) (W ithall, 1987) 
arose already in the beginning o f  the century (e.g., Dewey, 1916, 1938; Mon- 
tessori, 1928, 1973). Since the 1960s and 1970s a num ber o f  democratic socie­
ties have made systematic attempts to introduce child-centered methods into 
schools. Discovery learning (Bruner, 1960, 1966), meaningful verbal learning 
(Ausubel, 1963), conceptual change learning (Posner, Strike, Hewson & Gert- 
zog, 1982) —  these represent only a few o f  the influential alternative teaching 
methods. These methods stress the need to make use o f  children’s natural curi­
osity and to reinforce their interest in learning.
A constructivist or constructive view o f  learning, proceeding from Immanuel 
Kant and being based, besides others, on P iaget’s ideas, has been popular for 
several decades (Hendry, 1996). Learning is considered here a process o f  con­
structing and reconstructing personal theories and models. When students learn 
science meaningfully, they activate their existing knowledge, relate it to their 
educational experiences, and construct new knowledge in the form o f concep­
tual models, which consist o f  related concepts, not lists o f  unrelated facts 
(Glynn & Duit, 1995; Glynn, Yeany & Britton, 1991).
In reality, i f  the child-initiative-activities are overemphasized, it may result 
in quite alienating activities, where the learning potential is unsatisfactorily 
used (Bergqvist & Säljö, 1994). It is not enough to permit a child to discover 
the reality. Scientific explanations are theory-based and cannot be derived from 
observations only (Kuhn, 1962; Popper, 1963; Tulviste, 1991; Carey & Smith, 
1993; Tiberghien, 1994; Albanese, Danhoni N eves & Vicentini, in press). A c­
tually, it is a widespread naive assumption that the physical world is immedi­
ately given, and that it can be understood essentially without m ediation by 
means o f  cultural tools such as language and models. The assumption that stu­
dents can generate their own questions and find answers to the questions that 
constitute m odem  science (cf. Gallas, 1995) is too simplistic; it is not enough to 
build lessons only on children’s questions, using inductive types o f learning. 
For formulating appropriate questions (which is as difficult as formulating good 
answers) w hich enable to get an insight into the discipline, the following theory 
is obligatory (Bergqvist & Säljö, 1994; Tiberghien, 1994). So, proceeding from 
students’ interests and activating them (e.g. through experimentation, generat­
ing their own questions and looking for answers, participating in group work) is 
necessary but not enough (cf. Kikas & Hagstrom, 1993).
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The teacher’s role in student-centered teaching/learning should be twofold. 
First, only she or he is able to provide knowledge not only o f concrete phenom ­
ena (seen by experim entation) but o f a w ider theoretical perspective, assisting 
the developm ent o f  students’ scientific thinking. So, it is not only students’ ex­
periments and questions that are important, but teachers’ generative questions 
and interpretations are important as well (e.g., Champagne, K lopfer & Gun- 
stone, 1982). Second, a teacher can facilitate the conceptual development and 
change in each student if  the potential o f  ZPD is made use o f  (education is 
ahead o f  development). The actualization o f knowledge on ZPD takes place 
with the help o f  teachers in school (e.g., Tharp & Gallimore, 1988; Moll, 1990).
Earlier research in conceptual development and educational psychology has 
shown that:
1) children have integrated knowledge o f  natural phenomena;
2) teaching changes it quite little;
3) the reasons why the change does not occur could be partly explained by tra­
ditional teaching methods.
According to the sociocultural approach, it is very important to study in de­
tail such activity settings as school and mediational means such as language. 
But there are very few thorough empirical investigations, which study concep­
tual developm ent and change and take into account students’ earlier knowledge 
and the ways o f  teaching and learning. M y empirical research deals with these 
problems.
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3. CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION: 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
3.1. Methodology
The defining method is one o f  the oldest methods for studying conceptual de­
velopm ent (e.g., Feifel & Lorge, 1950; Litowitz, 1977; W atson, 1985; Snow, 
1990). The pluses and minuses o f  this method are discussed in P a p e r  I. The 
method was used in studies described in P a p e r  I  and P a p e r  III.
Unstructured interviews have been used both in the research on conceptual 
developm ent and science teaching (Luria, 1976; Carey, 1985; M ichaels & 
Bruce, 1989; Lewis & Linn, 1994; Bell, 1995; M cNeal, 1995). In such inter­
views, questions are adjusted to a child’s answers. Parallels could be drawn 
with P iaget’s clinical interviews (Piaget, 1929). Such interviews are used in 
P a p e r  III.
Vosniadou (Vosniadou, 1992; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992; 1994) has differ­
entiated between two types o f  questions: factual and generative. They stress 
that the latter are o f  greater use in conceptual development research. Generative 
questions are about phenom ena that individuals cannot observe directly, and 
about which they are not likely to have received any direct instruction. These 
questions have the potential to reveal the kinds o f  mental models that individu­
als use generatively, as opposed to the kind o f information they have m em o­
rized and used in familiar, school-related situations. The problem with the re­
search described in P a p e r  IV  is ju s t that it is based mainly on factual questions. 
Factual questions are asked also in school to assess children’s knowledge.
Illustrations, besides verbal descriptions, are another way to represent 
knowledge. C hildren’s drawings have also been used to study their concepts 
(e.g., V osniadou & Brewer, 1992; 1994; Arnold, Sarge & Worrall, 1995; Bax­
ter, 1995). Illustrations are used in the study described in P a p e r  V.
Observation and discourse analysis o f  textbooks and lessons have been used 
in educational studies as well (e.g., M ehan, 1979; Heath, 1987; M ichaels & 
Bruce, 1989). All my empirical studies conducted an initial analysis o f  the ways 
how terms and topics were treated in textbooks. Lessons’ discourse was ana­
lyzed in the study described in P a p e r  III . The first half o f  this investigation 
was a part o f  a cross-cultural study carried out in collaboration with Sarah 
M ichaels o f  the Literacy Institute (Cambridge, MA, USA). An overview o f  the 
methodology is given in the work by M ichaels and Bruce (1989). This study 
was longitudinal, others were cross-sectional.
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3.2. Main results
All my empirical research was carried out in ordinary Estonian schools. The 
last three studies deal with the problems o f conceptual development and change 
in the field o f astronomy. The aims and the main results o f  the studies are the 
following.
1. The aim o f  the first investigation (P ap e r I) was to study the differences 
between definitions o f  scientific and everyday concepts. The results did not 
confirm the Vygotskian hypothesis concerning the developmental advantage o f  
conscious awareness o f  scientific concepts over everyday ones. These results 
showed that the pre-school knowledge plays an important part in later devel­
opment in school (cf. Glynn & Duit, 1995).
2. The analysis o f  elementary and middle school science textbooks showed 
that emphasis is on the definitions o f terms and long descriptions o f phenom­
ena. The explanations in books fail to take into account children’s naive knowl­
edge, nor do they stress the critical knowledge that is necessary for under­
standing scientific explanations. The same problems with school text books 
have been stressed in the literature as well (e.g., M ichaels & Bruce, 1989; Stin- 
ner, 1995).
The classroom study (P ap e r II I)  showed that the teaching was based heav­
ily on the textbook, the teacher retold the textbook several times. There was no 
discussion o f  students’ everyday knowledge. The teaching relied mainly on 
memory and not on thinking (cf. Vygotsky 1994c). The teacher used only fac­
tual questions in assessing students’ understanding. The answers to these ques­
tions were provided in the book and had been stressed by the teacher earlier (cf. 
Vosniadou, 1994). Students were passive receivers o f  knowledge. Several re­
searchers have stressed that it is impossible to acquire knowledge in this way 
(Piaget, 1973; Vygotsky, 1983; Glynn & Duit, 1995). Students had no other 
possibility to use the knowledge that was learned in classroom than to answer 
to the teacher’s questions (cf. Tulviste, 1991; Howe, Tolmie & Rodgers, 1992; 
Bergqvist & Säljö, 1994).
3. All the studies indicated a strong influence o f teaching on students’ verbal 
explanations shortly after teaching in school (“exact” explanations o f 5th grad­
ers). In older grades, new themes derived from  the lately studied topics 
emerged in the answers (e.g., climate zones that were studied in the 7th grade). 
These results differ from the earlier research done in the U.S. in that students 
did not know scientific explanations even shortly after learning them 
(e.g., Sadler, 1987; M ichaels & Bruce, 1989).
However, students soon forgot the scientific explanations and facts and re­
turned to their everyday knowledge —  7th and 9th grade students gave fewer 
“exact” and more “aggregate” explanations than 5th graders (both longitudinal 
and cross-sectional data). It seems that students only memorized the school 
knowledge but did not understand it and, therefore, did not integrate it with
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everyday knowledge. So, the verbal acquisition o f  knowledge was quite illu­
sory.
4. On the other hand, the impact o f  teaching on students’ drawings was not 
considerable. A lthough textbooks provide schemes to help students understand 
the topic, teachers do not require their memorization. It seems that one part o f  
students acquired the verbal facts and illustrations separately at first, memoriz­
ing m ainly the verbal school knowledge (as is usually required by the teacher) 
but did not draw their illustrations on the basis o f  explanations. Drawings, 
rather than explanations, enable us to determine how students have understood 
the phenomena.
5. The results show that the teaching which stresses memorization can give 
outwardly good results shortly after learning the topic in school. Such teaching, 
however, is not effective in the longer perspective. Students can incorporate 
new school knowledge into their answers very easily. But as the teaching does 
not encourage the integration o f  everyday and school knowledge, students tend 
to forget the explanations and fall back to their everyday explanations.
6. The results raised the question o f  assessing students’ understanding o f 
knowledge. In school teachers assess the acquisition and understanding o f  stu­
dents’ knowledge m ainly with such questions to which the answers are given in 
the textbook, i.e., with factual questions (cf. Vosniadou, 1994). The studies 
showed that the correct answers o f  5th graders did not mean that they had un­
derstood the phenomena. “Good” answers were, in fact, repetitions o f  the 
wording that was to be found in books, and students were able to provide them 
without fully understanding their meaning. They are mere verbalisms, parrot­
like repetitions, against which Vygotsky warned (Vygotsky, 1994c). Asking 
students to illustrate their explanations is one possible way to gain a deeper in­
sight into students’ understanding.
I am fully aware that the results o f  my study do not enable me to draw far- 
reaching conclusions about the impact o f  school education on students’ con­
ceptual development. So far, I have studied the development in the field o f  as­
tronomy; classroom  discourse was studied in one school only. It would be nec­
essary to study the conceptual development and change o f  other concepts as 
well. In addition, at present it is possible to conduct a comparative study o f 
Estonian students who attend ordinary mainstream and alternative schools.
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KOOLILASTE MÕISTETE ARENG: 
KOOLIHARIDUSE MÕJU
Kokkuvõte
Dissertatsioonis käsitletakse laste m õistete arengu teoreetilisi ja  praktilisi küsi­
musi. Antakse ülevaade probleemi uurimise ajaloost, alates J. P iaget’ ja  
L. Võgotski töödest, ja  tänapäevastest rõhuasetustest. Tõdetakse, et varasemad 
tööd kognitiivses ja  hariduspsühholoogias on näidanud, et 1) lastel on loodus­
nähtustest integreeritud ettekujutused; 2) kooliharidus muudab neid suhteliselt 
vähe ja  3) võib oletada, et põhjus, miks muutust mõistetes ei toimu, peitub vä­
hem alt osaliselt traditsioonilises õpetamismetoodikas. Lähtun sotsiokultuurili- 
sest käsitlusest, kus rõhutatakse, et on oluline uurida keskkonda, kus tegevus 
toimub, ning märgilisi vahendajaid, mille abil teadmisi edastatakse. V äga vähe 
on empiirilisi töid, kus uuritakse m õistete arengut ja  muutumist, võttes arvesse 
nii laste eelteadm isi kui õpetamise viise. M inu empiirilised uurimused püüavad 
seda lünka täita.
D issertatsioonis esitatud järeldused põhinevad järgm istel töödel.
I  töö eesmärgiks oli kontrollida Võgotski hüpoteesi teaduslike mõistete 
teadvustamise eelisarengust võrreldes tavam õistetega tänapäeva Eesti ühiskon­
nas. Tulem used ei kinnitanud hüpoteesi, viidates sellele, et enne kooli oman­
datud teadm istel on hilisemale arengule suur tähtsus.
I I  töös käsitletakse mõtlemise ja  keele heterogeensusega seotud teoreetilisi 
küsimusi. Rõhk on koolikeele eripära analüüsimisel.
Kolmes viimases töös uuritakse empiiriliselt koolilaste mõistete arengut ja  
koolihariduse m õju sellele arengule astronoomiliste mõistete näitel. Kõik uuri­
mused on tehtud tavalistes eesti koolides.
I I I  töö kirjeldab longituuduurimuse (20 last, 5. ja  9. klass) tulemusi. Uuriti 
kooliõpetuse m õju laste astronoomia-alastele definitsioonidele ja  selgitustele. 
Töös analüüsiti õpikuid ja  töövihikuid ning õpetamisviise. Lapsi intervjueeriti 
kaks korda: kaks kuud ja  neli aastat pärast teem a läbimist koolis. Tulemused 
näitasid, et kaks kuud pärast õppim ist vastasid lapsed enam-vähem õpikusõna- 
dega, kuid neli aastat hiljem esitasid enamasti tavaseletusi.
IV  töö kirjeldab ristlõikelise uurimuse (252 õpilast, 3., 5., 7., 9. klass) tule­
musi. Uuriti õpetuse m õju laste astronoomia-alastele selgitustele. Selgitused 
jagati kooli (nt, öö ja  päev vahelduvad, sest maa pöörleb ümber oma telje) ja  
tavaselgitusteks (nt, öö ja  päev vahelduvad, sest me peame puhkama). Tulemu­
sed kinnitasid varasem a töö tulemusi. Näidati õpetamise tugevat mõju 5. klassi 
laste selgitustele. Kuid et lapsed õppisid selgitused vaid pähe, unustasid nad
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need varsti j a  pöördusid vanemates klassides tagasi tavaseletuste juurde. Samas 
lisandusid õpilaste vastustesse uued mõisted ja  teemad, mis pärinesid äsjaõpita- 
vast m aterjalist (nt, kliim avööndid aastaaegade vaheldumise selgitamisel).
V  töö kirjeldab sama ristlõikelise uurimuse tulemusi, kuid lisaks seletustele 
analüüsitakse ka illustratsioone. N ii seletused kui ka joonised jagati täpseteks, 
agregaat- j a  kirjeldavateks vastusteks. Näidati õpetamise tugevat mõju selgi­
tustele, kuid m itte joonistele. Osa 5. klassi õpilasi, kes andsid täpse selgituse, 
illustreerisid oma vastust agregaat-joonistega. See näitab, et nende head ver­
baalsed teadm ised olid näilised. H iljem  pöörduvadki need lapsed tavaselgituste 
juurde tagasi.
Tehtud tööd näitavad, et m õistete arengu uurimisel on sotsiokultuurilise 
konteksti arvestam ine väga oluline. Varasem atest töödest on selgunud, et lastel 
on sügavalt omaksvõetud koolieelsed, nüüdisaegsetest seletustest erinevad 
tavaseletused, mis säilivad ka vaatam ata kooliõpetusele. Seda, kuidas uusi 
teadm isi koolis tegelikult õpetatakse, on varasemates töödes vähe uuritud. D is­
sertatsiooni tööd võim aldavad analüüsida ja  põhjendada, miks koolis õpetata­
vaid m õisteid ei omandatud.
Em piiriliste uurim uste rakenduslikust aspektist huvipakkuvad tulemused on 
järgm ised.
1. Eesti kooliõpikutes on rõhk term inite õpetamisel. Raamatus kirjeldatav ei 
arvesta laste tavateadmistega. Õpetus klassis tugineb oluliselt õpikule. Õpe­
taja ju tustab  ümber raam atu teksti, õpilased on suhteliselt passiivsed vastu­
võtjad, kes peavad vastam a õpetaja küsimustele. Esitatavatele küsimustele 
on võim alik õpikust vastust leida. Paljud teadlased (Piaget, 1973; Võgotski, 
1983; Glynn & Duit, 1995) rõhutavad, et niimoodi on teadmisi omandada 
võimatu.
2. Õpetamine muudab tugevalt laste verbaalseid selgitusi vahetult pärast teem a 
läbimist. Lapsed liidavad õpitavat oma selgitustesse väga kergesti. Kuid nad 
unustavad koolis õpitu varsti, pöördudes tagasi oma tavaselgituste juurde. 
Samasugust mõju joonistele ei leitud. Tundub, et osa lapsi omandab joon i­
sed ja  selgitused eraldi, õppides pähe vaid sõnad, seejuures mitte mõistes 
nende sisu. M ittemõistm ine avaldub kummalistes joonistes.
3. Kooliõpetus, kus rõhk on päheõppimisel, võib anda väliselt häid tulemusi 
vahetult pärast õpetamist, kuid pole efektiivne kaugemas perspektiivis.
4. Tulemused tõstatasid ka küsimuse, kuidas hinnata m õistetest-nähtustest aru­
saamist. Faktilised küsimused (vrd Vosniadou, 1994) seda teha ei võimalda. 
“Head” vastused võivad olla lihtsalt õpiku teksti kordamine. Illustreerimine 
on üks võim alus sügavama arusaamise hindamiseks.
Loom ulikult ei saa tehtud tööde põhjal teha koolihariduse mõju kohta suuri 
üldistusi, uuritud on siiski vaid ühte mõistete valdkonda, tunnis toimuvat on 
kirjeldatud vaid ühes klassis. Tulevikus oleks vaja uurida ka teiste mõistete 
arengut ja  koolihariduse mõju. Lisaks saab tänapäeva Eestis teha tav a - ja  alter- 
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E v e  k ik a s
The Development of Word 
Definitions in Children
Many studies have dealt with the development o f word definition in 
children. An account of the earlier studies is given by Feifcl & Lorge 
[11; the later ones, by a number of investigators [2-16]. As a rule, 
researchers have studied American or European middle- and upper- 
class children who were age four and older. They have usually asked 
children to define words with which they were all familiar.
In all the studies, researchers have found qualitative differences 
between the types of definition used by younger and older children; 
these have been attributed to differences in their conceptual thinking. 
Younger children define words nonabstractly (using mainly functional 
and descrip tive definitions, repetition, pointing, and exam ples) 
whereas children age nine and older more frequently define abstractly. 
Results concerning the relative weights o f descriptive and functional 
definitions arc equivocal. In some studies young children give more 
descriptive definitions [2]; in others, more functional ones [4|.
Certain factors must be taken into account when interpreting the 
results of previous studies. First, problems exist with the classification 
of definitions. In classic theories, adults’ thinking has been treated as 
universal and, in modem societies, abstract. Knowledge is said to con­
sist of static and well-packed information in which definitions corre­
spond uniquely to the objective world. These assumptions procccd 
from an Aristotelian understanding of adults’ definitions, which rests 
on specific defining attributes o f properties. This view bejjan to change 
with Rosch’s work [17], which demonstrated that even adults’ “world 
views” and arrangements of concepts in memory arc not static, but
1 he author is associated with the Department of Psychology, Tartu University, 
Tartu, Estonia.
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more or less dynamic. Numerous other studies have reinforced this 
poinl 118,19]. There lore, simple classifications (abslract/nonabstract or 
abstract/lunctional/descriptive definitions) seem to l>e insufficient even 
to characterize adults’ conceptual thinking. It is especially difficult to 
treat definitions given by children and by members of traditional socie­
ties in such a concrete way because o f their wide variety [12,20].
Secondly, the task of defining is quite artificial. Correct use of many 
concepts does not require their preliminary conscious definition [21], 
nor arc definitions demanded in everyday life [12]. Defining is re­
quired for concepts the use of which demands accuracy, or when a 
correct classification has high value [11,22]. Defining is important in 
contemporary science, but not in many other spheres of activity [23], 
The method is adequate specifically for studying the development of 
formal types of (e.g., scientific) thinking [23].
Earlier studies have paid little attention to the question of why the 
type of definition changes with age. We assume that the growing role 
of abstract definitions should first of all show the development of 
scientific thinking in the child, which is shaped by formal education. 
To demonstrate this, we constructed tests on the basis of the data 
distilled from analyses o f schoolbooks. Wc based our work on 
Vygotsky’s theory of the cultural development of higher psychological 
functions [24-26]. Before proceeding, let us consider the main points 
of his theory (concerning the development of concepts) in current con­
texts.
Concept development:
A Vygotskian approach and beyond
The concept as a unit o f verbal thinking has an important role in 
Vygotsky’s theory about higher psychological functions. Vygotsky 
sees the reasons lor the development of these processes in general, as 
well as the reasons for the development of concepts in particular, as 
cuUural. He distinguishes between scientific and everyday concepts
[24,26] and associates the impact of science on the child’s thinking 
processes (the development of scientific thinking) with the formation 
and development of new kinds of concepts, namely, scientific ones. It 
is important to stress that Vygotsky does not regard scientific concepts 
simply as those related to natural or exact sciences; rather, he identifies 
scientific concepts with those learned in school.
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The characteristic features of scientific concepts are:
1. They belong to special conceptual systems.
2. The thinker is consciously aware of them, i.e., reflects on them.
3. They enter into “supraempineal,” expcricncc-cxternal connec­
tions.
When studying the development of verbal thinking processes and, 
especially, the development of scientific thinking, it is essential to 
consider that, according to Vygotsky, scientific and everyday concepts 
develop in different ways. The main differences are:
1. Differences in formation : A child masters an everyday concept 
by being in direct contact with its denotatum (the object[s] to which the 
word for that concept refers); scientific concepts are learned verbally, 
by definition.
2. Differences in development: An everyday concept develops “up­
ward” (from a concrete object to general abstractions) whereas a scientific 
concept develops “downward” (initially given in a concept’s system, it 
later becomes more concrete).
3. Different strengths and weaknesses: Children can use everyday 
concepts better in everyday situations, without being conscious of their 
meaning, whereas they can define scientific concepts better, though 
they may be unable to use them in concrete situations.
According to Vygotsky, children first start to define abstractly those 
concepts that are taught in school by definitions, i.e., scientific con­
cepts. The ability to define abstractly is only afterward extended to 
everyday concepts in which Uic objects referred to arc well known to 
children, but which lack the inevitability o f being defined. The devel­
opmental advantage of scientific concept awareness compared with 
everyday concept awareness has been confirmed by several experi­
ments in communities into which formal schooling has been intro­
duced [23,27].
Tulviste [23] showed that the Vygotskian classification of conccpls 
into scientific and everyday ones requires revision in several aspccts. 
He stressed the need to correlate the typology with concrete types of 
activity— the properties of scientific concepts, for example, with the 
peculiarities of science. At least two questions arise when equating 
scientific concepts with those studied in school in modem societies. 
First, not all concepts are studied by means o f abstract definitions in 
school. Teaching, especially in elementary grades, builds on children’s 
everyday knowledge. Sccond, modem societies are so “permeated”
9
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with acadcmic discourse that children become acquainted with defin­
ing even before entering school [28,29]. Here the spheres of activity 
and knowledge at home and in school are not absolutely separated as 
they are in societies into which formal schooling is introduced from 
outside [30]. Several studies have shown that home socialization has a 
significant impact on children’s later development in school [10,16,31].
Tulviste mentions that little is known about the factors in schooling 
that promote the development of scientific thinking (and scientific con­
cepts) in children. He writes: “We know little how the peculiarities of 
science . . . manifest themselves in the information assimilated in 
school and in solving school problem s” [23. P. 157]. Vygotsky 
stressed the importance of acquiring literacy (see also [32]) and acquir­
ing scientific knowledge. He introduced the notion o f the zone of 
proximal development (ZPD), which is defined as “the distance be­
tween the actual developmental level as determined by independent 
problem solving and the level o f potential development as determined 
through problem solving under adult guidance or [in] collaboration 
with more capable peers” [25. P. 86]. It “permits us to delineate the 
child’s immediate future and his dynamic developmental state, allow­
ing not only for what already has been achieved developmentally but 
also for what is in the course of maturing” [25. P. 87] (see also
[24,26]). Much research has been carried out on the ZPD (see, e.g., 
[33-36]. Mainly, these have been studies focusing on problem solving 
either in everyday life or in school. No attention has been paid to its 
connection with scientific and everyday concepts.
Vygotsky also used the notion of the ZPD to discuss the develop­
mental advantage of scientific concepts compared with everyday ones, 
speaking of scientific concepts as belonging to the level of actual de­
velopment and of everyday concepts as belonging to the level of poten­
tial development ([24] the phrase is not translated into English in 
Vygotsky’s later work [26]). The actualization of knowledge in a ZPD 
(tiie development o f everyday concepts) takes place with the help of 
teachers in school. Vygotsky did not describe specific ways in which 
this was accomplished during lessons.
The development of definitions of scientific and everyday concepts 
has not been studied comparatively in modern societies; hence, our 
experiments are aimed at such a comparison. The defining test was 
constructed on the basis of previous analyses of textbooks. It enabled 
us to include scientific concepts (according to Vygotsky’s definition)
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in the test. In addition to studying schoolchildren by means of the 
defining test, we studied kindergarteners by means o f a concept com­
prehension test (using the same words as in the defining test). This 
enabled us to take into account more concretely children’s preschool 
knowledge of definitions.
Selection of concepts for the test
To determine the influence of formal education on word defining and 
to test the Vygotskian hypothesis o f the developmental advantage of 
scientific concepts (compared with everyday ones), the tests were con­
structed on the basis of data acquired by analyzing schoolbooks.
In Estonian schools, each child has one textbook per subject and one 
or two workbooks to accompany each textbook. Teachers follow the 
books very precisely, so an analysis o f the books provides a good idea 
about what is taught in a classroom. Generally, theoretical knowledge 
(definitions, descriptions, etc.) is given in the textbooks, and problems, 
in the workbooks. Children study from the same books while doing 
homework at home. Teachers question children to some extent on their 
knowledge (including asking for definitions) of each lesson. Written 
tests arc given once or twice a semester.
Wc included mathematics and natural science concepts as represen­
tatives of scientific conccpts in our study. These concepts present con­
trasts in several ways. For example, it is difficult (if not impossible) 
even for scientists to give exact definitions (to list necessary-and-suffi- 
cicnt features) of many natural phenomena, whereas such definitions 
arc commonplace in mathematics. Accordingly, differences between 
the development of children’s definitions o f mathematics and natural 
science concepts can be presumed. Textbooks and workbooks on these 
subjects in the first through fifth grades were analyzed in terms of the 
following questions:
1. When docs the defining of concepts begin in school?
2. What kind of definitions are produced?
3. What kind of knowledge system (cither everyday or scientific) is 
taught?
Wc found differences in teaching definitions in the first through 
second and third through fifth grades. In the first two grades, the main 
emphasis in mathematics is on teaching addition and subtraction, al­
though sonic abstract definitions arc taught as well. In natural sciencc
classcs, the emphasis is on external descriptions of phenomena and on 
bringing out their usefulness. The material in the second grade is not 
divided according to scientific knowledge systems, but into: “Garden,” 
“Nature around us,” and “Field and domestic animals.” Abstract con­
cepts are taught systematically in mathematics from the third grade on. 
In the third grade, natural science is taught also by scientific domain. 
Definitions are stressed from the third grade on.
Twenty-six words were used to elicit concepts in tests: orange, blue­
berry, apple, bicycle, airplane, bat, bee, winter, the sun, the earth, river, 
lake, eye, water, lawn, weed, air, square, melting, ice, liquid, day and 
night (one word in Estonian), minute, meter, weighing, and measuring. 
In the Vygotskian sense, the tests include everyday concepts not stud­
ied in school, e.g., orange, scientific concepts studied in school by 
definitions, e.g., square; and, so to speak, intermediate concepts, which 
are known from everyday life and also studied in school (usually in 
new, scientific connections, e.g., the sun). We were thus able to com­
pare the development of definitions of scientific and everyday con­
c e p ts . O u r s tu d y  w ith  k in d e rg a r te n e r s  u s in g  th e  c o n c e p t 
comprehension test enabled us to take into account children’s pre­




It has been shown that even little children can comprehend the mem­
bers of abstract categories even though they do not categorize abstractly 
themselves [37,38].
We studied children’s comprehension of concepts from abstract def­
initions. Rather than ask for the definition of a word, we gave the 
abstract definition and asked for the word in response. This test en­
abled us to study the concepts that children knew passively. In other 
words, the children did not need to be able to define the word, but only 
to recognize it by its definition.
Responses (definitions) for the 26 study words were taken from the 
Estonian Child Encyclopedia or from textbooks. Twenty-six 5- and 
6-year-old children from a kindergarten in Tartu (the second largest 
town in Estonia, with a population of more than 100,000) participated
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in the study. An experimenter told the children that it was a guessing 
task. She read aloud definitions to each child separately. After each 
definition she asked from a child: “ Do you know what it is?”
Results
On the basis of the test results, the concepts could be divided into four 
groups:
1. Well-known concepts (66%-100% correct answers): orange, blue­
berry, apple, bicycle, airplane, bat, bee, winter, the sun.
2. Moderately well-known concepts (33%-66% correct answers): 
water, eye, river, lake, the earth.
3. Little-known concepts (10%-33% correct answers): lawn, weed, 
air, square.
4. Unknown concepts (no correct answers): melting, ice, liquid, day 
and night, minute, meter, weighing, measuring.
The results of the concept comprehension test indicated that chil­
dren enter school with passive knowledge of definitions of some con­
cepts. As we assumed, there are also several concepts that children 
learn only later in school.
Experim ental study 2:
Word definition test
Testing procedure
In this study we used the definition method in a classic way, i.e., the 
children responded to the question “What is x?” Data were collected at 
a representative school in Tartu. Children enter school at approxi­
mately 7 years of age and may study there for 11 years. We studied 
schoolchildren in grades one through five during lessons. An experi­
menter gave the children lists with words to be defined in writing 
and helped to clarify some problems not connected with defining. 
This included helping some first-graders write down answers as 
they were not able to write on their own. Teachers did not take part 
in the testing. It took children from half an hour (for fifth-graders) to 
one hour (for first-graders) to complete the test. All the children com­
pleted the test. Grade 1 consisted of 24 7-8-year-olds; grade 2, of 15 
9-10-year-olds; grade 4, of 22 11-12-year-olds; and grade 5, o f 22 
11-year-olds.
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Figure 1. The relationship between definition type and grade.
Results
The responses were organized according to the most widespread clas­
sification o f definitions: (7) abstract, conceptual, or semantic defini­
tions (by genus or, m ore exactly, by specific differences); (2) 
functional definitions (the function of an object is given); (3) descrip­
tive definitions (external features o f an object are described, the con­
cept is specified, an example is given, or a concrete situation is 
described in connection with the object); (4) incorrect definitions (no 
answers, incorrect answers, or excessively broad definitions). The re­
sults of the test are shown in Figure 1.
As can be seen, abstract defining began to predominate in the third 
grade (i.e., from the age of nine or ten years). This is consistent with 
the literature, which has shown the turning point from nonabstract to 
abstract definitions at about age nine.
Some decline in the role of abstract definitions in our fifth-grade sam­
ple may be explained by the fact that teachers considered the fourth-grad­
ers in question more successful in their studies than the fifth-graders.
It was mentioned earlier that the distribution of descriptive and 
functional definitions has not been unequivocally delineated. In the 
case of our children, there were more descriptive definitions than func-
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lional ones. This may be related to the fact that in our test we used 
many words that represent abstract concepts, and the objects to which 
the names of these concepts referred were difficult to find a function 
for (e.g., melting). However, it should also be pointed out that very few 
functional definitions were given to the concepts of objects witli seem­
ingly important functions for children (e.g., “winter/to ski and sled,” 
“lake/to swim”).
Shifts in the nature of descriptive definitions not described in the 
literature became evident as well. Just as the role of abstract definitions 
was different in the first through second and third through fifth grades, 
the descriptions in these grades were different as well. The first- 
graders’ associative rather than descriptive answers (e.g., “air/wind”) 
arc replaced by more thorough (scientific) explanations o f phenomena 
or objects (e.g., “air/natural resources; atmosphere”). The most evident 
description shifts are seen among natural science objects and phenom­
ena (melting, water, ice, bat, bee, winter, river, the earth, the sun, day 
and night). However, there are no such differences in the descriptive 
defin itions of concepts that have a good prototype (e.g., “ liq­
uid/water”) or essential function (e.g., “eye/to see”). It was characteris­
tic that thorough descriptions were given only to natural objects and 
phenomena. In mathematics the corresponding shift was from associa­
tive answers to abstract definitions. Here differences are seen between 
natural sciences and exact sciences (see above).
Testing the Vygotskian hypothesis
To test the Vygotskian hypothesis, we compared the development of 
abstract definitions of three types o f concepts: everyday (orange, blue­
berry, apple, bicycle, bee), natural science (melting, river, the sun, air, 
liquid), and mathematical (minute, meter, weighing, m easuring, 
square). The results of this comparison are shown in Figure 2.
It is evident that more abstract definitions arc given to the everyday 
concepts. While this holds true even for the first grade, even greater 
differences arc seen in grades three through five, where abstract defini­
tions generally predominate. Abstract definitions were given to 80% - 
90% of the everyday concepts, in contrast to only 36% -55%  of 
scientific concepts. Our results do not confirm the Vygotskian hypoth­
esis of the developmental advantage of conscious awareness for scien­
tific conccpts compared with everyday ones. The children did not
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pared with the everyday ones. Wc did not find a “downward” develop­
ment ol' concepts learned in school (but unknown to children from 
everyday life). Instead, our child subjects displayed poor knowledge of 
their abstract definitions (see Figures 2 and 3). In our society, school 
knowledge does not develop separately from everyday knowledge, as 
has been reported in so-called traditional societies. We cannot differen­
tiate concept domains such as everyday versus scientific so clearly. It 
is better to talk about the development of a new type of—scientific—  
thinking and connect it with school activities (see [22]). Scientific 
thinking is shaped in school, but on the basis of well-known (every­
day) concepts.
To explain our results, we make use of Vygotsky’s notion of the 
ZPD (see above). He wrote about scientific concepts as belonging to 
the level of actual development and about everyday concepts as be­
longing to the level of potential development. We did not find scien­
tific concepts at the level of actual development (i.e., “downward” 
development). Instead, we found (from the comprehension test) ab­
stract definitions of everyday concepts within children’s ZPD. Chil­
dren, however, do not actively use these definitions before grade three. 
They consider striking features and function more essential than the 
abstract scientific definition. Our studies showed that the concepts 
known passively and earlier by children were defined abstractly by 
them earlier, but only when abstract definitions were being stressed 
and this knowledge was demanded in school, i.e., with the help of 
teachers. We should therefore argue that children first acquire scien­
tific knowledge incidentally and are not consciously aware o f its later 
usefulness.
When the scientific system is demanded in school, conscious aware­
ness of the concepts (whose definitions are at the level of potential 
development) proceeds more easily. It is seen both in mi increase in the 
amount of abstract definitions and in the production of more thorough 
descriptions. The actualization takes place with the help of teachers in 
school. The cultural background of the fact that abstract definitions 
b eg in  to dominate from the third grade on can be found in school 
materials. Emphasis on systematic scientific knowledge and defining 
starts specifically in the third grade. In the first two grades, the main 
em phasis in mathematics is on teaching addition and subtraction, and in 
natural science studies (in which these descriptions are given by external 
domains, not by scientific ones), on describing natural phenomena.
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Conclusions
In this paper wc have examined, theoretically and experimentally, 
problems of word definition development in children, in contrast to 
earlier studies, our tests were developed on the basis of data acquired 
by analysis of schoolbooks. Our aim was to compare the development 
of everyday and scientific concepts and to study the impact of formal 
education on defining.
We did not find a developmental advantage in conscious awareness 
of scicntific concepts compared with everyday ones. It became evident 
that Vygotsky’s theoretical views need specifying in our (modem) 
society, in which children become acquainted with definitions before 
they enter school. Earlier researchers, confirming the developmental 
advantage of conscious awareness o f scientific concepts compared 
with everyday ones, have carried out their studies in societies in 
which the main, and nearly only, source o f scientific knowledge was 
really the school. However, our society is so “permeated” with sci- 
cncc that wc cannot confine scientific concepts to those taught in 
school.
Wc found that schoolchildren defined better (i.e., gave more ab­
stract definitions to) those words that kindergarteners recognized accu­
rately by their definitions (i.e., specifically, everyday concepts). Wc 
explain this finding by using Vygotsky’s notion of the ZPD: initially 
children begin to define abstractly words whose abstract definitions arc 
within their ZPD. Still to be investigated is how that potential knowl­
edge is actualized in classrooms. The present study opens the door to 
such future research.
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Over the course of her career Sylvia Scribner made numerous contribu­
tions to our understanding of how human activity is related to psycho­
logical functioning. H er focus on activity is most explicit in the ingenious 
analyses she conducted near the end o f her career on cognitive processes 
in the workplace, analyses that were specifically grounded in the theory 
of activity outlined by Leont’ev (1981) and others. In our view, however, 
Scribner made major contributions to what may be termed an activity 
oriented approach to psychology even before she began explicitly 
grounding her claims in the writings of activity theorists. For example, 
her decades of work on the relationship between literacy and psychologi­
cal processes are perhaps best understood in terms of what she and her 
colleagues came to call a “practice account of literacy” (Scribner & Cole 
1981, p. 235). T his and other earlier research concerned with literacy, 
language, and thought focused consistently on how “socially organized 
activities may come to have consequences for human thought” (p. 235). 
In one way or another, then, much of Scribner’s research can be viewed 
as being grounded in the assumption that the study of human mental 
functioning is best approached from the perspective of socioculturally 
situated activity.
In an attem pt to explicate the forms of activity Scribner considered in 
her studies o f literacy we shall harness the notion of “mediated action” 
(Wertsch 1991; Zinchenko 1985). Our use of this notion reflects the 
intellectual heritage we share with Scribner, a heritage grounded in the 
works of authors such as Vygotsky (1977, 1978, 1981, 1987), L eont’ev 
(1981), Tulviste (1991), and Zinchenko (1985). T he primary claim at
T he writing o f  this chapter was assisted by a grant from the Spencer Foundation to the 
first: author, who also w ishes to express his appreciation to the U niversity o f  Seville for its 
support during 1992-93. T h e  second author was assisted by a grant from the N ational 
M edical Enterprises Foundation, and the third author was supported by a special grant 
from the Frances L . Hiatt School o f  Psychology at Clark U niversity. T h e  statem ents 
made and the views expressed are solely the responsibility o f  the authors.
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issue here is that the use of “mediational means,” or “tools” such as lan­
guage shapes human action in essential ways. According to Vygotsky, “by 
being included in the process of behavior, the psychological tool [i.e., 
one form of mediational means] alters the entire flow and structure of 
mental functions. It does this by determining the structure of a new 
instrumental act, just as a technical tool alters the process of a natural 
adaptation by determining the form of labor operations” (1981, p. 137). 
W hen considering literacy practice as mediated action, the mediational 
means employed are the forms of language used in this activity setting, 
and the issue is how these mediational means are actively employed by 
humans such that they are appropriated, or incorporated into concrete 
action, thereby shaping the form this action takes.
One of the major contributions Scribner and her colleagues made to 
our understanding of literacy is that language is incorporated into action 
in a variety of ways, reflecting a variety of sociocultural settings and 
resulting in a variety of literacy practices (e.g., Scribner 1977; Scribner & 
Cole 1981). T he roots of this claim can be found in the writings of 
Vygotsky (1977, 1978, 1981, 1987) about the role of “technical” and 
“psychological” tools in organizing human mental processes, but it goes 
beyond Vygotsky’s formulation in its analysis of the range of cultural, 
historical, and institutional contexts that shape mediational means and 
hence human action.
In general, Vygotsky did not carry out detailed analyses of sociocultu­
ral context. He was only beginning to devote attention to this issue near 
the end of his life. This becomes apparent if one considers differences 
between chapters 5 and 6 of Thinking and Speech (1987). Chapter 5, “An 
experimental study of concept development,” was probably written 
sometime in the early 1930s. In it Vygotsky reported on research he had 
conducted with Sakharov (1930) in the late 1920s. Chapter 6, “The 
development of scientific concepts in childhood,” was written specific­
ally for the volume Thinking and Speech, which was published in 1934.
Although both chapters are concerned with concept development, 
there is a major difference between them in how this development was 
viewed as taking place. Chapter 5 deals with concept development in 
terms of individual mental functioning as measured in a clinical experi­
mental setting. Results from the Vygotsky-Sakharov block-sorting task 
were used to document the nature of various kinds o f complexes and the 
transition to pseudoconceptual and conceptual levels o f functioning.
In chapter 6, the concern with concept development continues to 
occupy center stage, but there is an im portant shift to considering con­
cept development in terms of how it is tied to forms o f discourse in a spe­
cific: institutional context, namely, formal schooling. This shift is 
reflected in the terminology Vygotsky employed. In contrast to chapter
5, where he wrote of “complexes,” “pseudoconcepts,” “genuine con­
cepts,” and other constructs that apply to individual mental functioning, 
chapter 6 deals with “scientific concepts,” a term Vygotsky had not 
employed in the previous chapter. T he Russian word involved here 
nauchnyi can also be translated as “academic” or “scholarly” instead of 
“scientific;” the term “scholarly” actually being used in the English 
translation of one of Luria’s works (Luria 1976).
T his shift in Vygotsky’s terminology reflects a more general shift in 
focus and a growing concern with how specific forms of mediated action 
are tied to the institutional context of the classroom. His focus had 
expanded beyond individual (“intram ental”) as well as dyadic or small 
group (“ interm ental”) functioning construed in a narrow way. In place of 
searching for the social origins of individual mental functioning solely in 
intermental processes, he was concerned with how individual and social 
processes are situated in a broader sociocultural context. Scribner 
extended this line of inquiry in her studies of literacy and workplace 
activities. In both realms her research led her to identify im portant dif­
ferences in socioculturally situated, material practice. For example, her 
studies of literacy led her to conclude that rather than being a monolithic 
essence or process, literacy activity and the psychological processes asso­
ciated with it take on various forms and that these forms reflect aspects 
of the institutional settings in which they appear.
M odes o f  th in k in g  a n d  w ays o f  sp eak in g
One of Scribner’s most interesting analyses of how forms of 
speaking and thinking are tied to activity settings can be found in her 
chapter “Modes of thinking and ways of speaking: Culture and logic 
reconsidered,” which appeared in the 1977 edited volume Thinking: 
Readings in Cognitive Science. Based on her review of numerous studies 
of differences between schooled and nonschooled subjects in solving ver­
bal logic problems (typically syllogisms), Scribner concluded
the overall level o f  performance o f  nonschooled traditional people and the w ithin-culture  
differences in perform ance betw een schooled and nonschooled groups suggest that logi­
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cal problem s pose special difficulties for traditional nonliterate people. U niform ities in 
patterns across cultures indicate that the source o f  these difficulties is not likely to reside 
in aspects o f  culture that are unique to any one o f  the given cultures. (1977, p. 487)
In trying to account for the sources o f the consistent differences she 
found between schooled and nonschooled peoples, Scribner turned to 
the notions of genre and performance as outlined by Hymes (1974).
[G Jenre  refers to stylistic structures or organized verbal forms with a beginning and a 
end, ‘and a pattern to what com es betw een. . . G reetings, farewells, riddles, proverbs, 
prayers, are am ong well-know n elem entary genres, and tales and m yths representative o f  
com plex genres, Performances refers to the use o f  genres in particular contexts. Both 
genres and performances may vary from one speech com m unity to another, and the rela­
tionship betw een them  may vary as well: certain genres in certain com m unities may be 
context-bound while in others they range over diverse events and situations. (Scribner, 
1977, pp. 497 -4 9 8 )
The specific issue that concerned Scribner in her analysis of literacy 
activities and their psychological correlates was the nature of what she 
termed the “logical genre.”
Let us entertain the proposition that verbal logic problem s . . . constitute a specialized  
language genre that stands apart from other genres in ways that may be difficult to define 
but are readily recognizable (just as poetry may be distinguished from prose by readers 
who may never exactly agree on what ‘poetry’ is). (Scribner 1977, p. 498)
In developing her account of the logical genre Scribner was dealing 
with a specific form of what we are calling mediated action and with the 
more general issues of a theory of activity. T he mediational means 
involved are the genres or “organized verbal forms” used by participants 
in her studies, and the concrete instantiation of these mediational means 
occurred in the form of performance, the “ use of genres in particular 
contexts.” Furtherm ore, Scribner made a series of claims about how the 
form that mediated action takes is related to the activity setting in which 
is appears. All this points to the idea that even though Scribner was not 
explicitly formulating her claims in the 1970s in terms of a theory of 
activity, she had important insights into what would constitute an activ­
ity-oriented approach and this approach played a major role in determ in­
ing what she saw as research issues and how she approached them.
Voices, genres, a n d  m o d es  o f  sp eak in g  an d  th in k in g
In recent years, a figure who has come to be recognized as a 
major contributor to our understanding of the motion of genre is 
Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1986; see also Clark &
Holquist 1984; Todorov 1984). Although Bakhtin was not in search of a 
Marxist approach to psychology, and although there is no indication that 
he was in direct contact with Vygotsky, his ideas provide extremely valu­
able complements and extensions o f Vygotsky’s notion of mediation 
(Wertsch 1991). O f particular interest for our purposes is Bakhtin’s 
notion of “speech genre.”
When writing of speech genres, Bakhtin was specifically focusing on 
speech, which occurs in the form of utterances, in contrast to linguistic 
forms (e.g., sentences) abstracted away from the form of action he called 
“speech communication.” This focus on speech as action rather than 
on linguistic structures abstracted out of action also characterized 
Vygotsky’s writings, a point that is sometimes overlooked because of the 
mistranslation of the title of his best known volume as Thought and Lan­
guage instead of Thinking and Speech.
Bakhtin insisted that an adequate account of speech communication 
could be derived only by focusing on “the real unit of speech communi­
cation: the utterance” (1986, p. 17) since “speech can exist in reality only 
in the form of concrete utterances of individual speaking people, speech 
subjects” (1986, p. 71). In his view an essential key to understanding the 
nature of utterances is recognizing a level of organization between ab­
stracted linguistic form or structure, on the one hand, and unique, con- 
textualized utterances, on the other. T his is a level that has been largely 
missing in linguistic analysis since Saussure. As Holquist (1986, p. xvi) 
has noted
Saussure conceived the individual language user to be an absolutely free agent with the 
ability to choose any words to im plem ent a particular intention. Saussure concluded , not 
surprisingly, that language as used by heterogeneous m illions o f  such willful subjects was 
unstudiable, a chaotic jungle beyond the capacity o f  science to domesticate.
Bakhtin, on the other hand, begins by assum ing that individual speakers do not have 
the kind o f  freedom parole assumes they have: the basic unit for the study o f  actual 
speech practice is the “utterance,” which “with all its individuality and creativity, can in 
no way be regarded as a completely free combination o f  forms o f  language, as is supposed, 
for example, by Saussure . . . who juxtaposed the utterance (la parole) as a purely individ­
ual act, to the system  o f  language as a phenom enon that is purely social and mandatory 
for the individual.”
The intermediate level of organization that Bakhtin proposed in order 
to deal with this issue is to be found in categories of utterance categories, 
or types such as speech genres. Speech genres are “relatively stable and
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normative forms of the utterance” (1986, p. 81). It is this level of organi­
zation that makes it the case that the utterance, with all its properties of 
individuality and uniqueness, is nonetheless not a “completely free combi­
nation of forms of language” (Bakhtin 1986, p. 81). According to Bakhtin 
(1986, p. 87)
A speech genre is not a form o f  language, but a typical form o f  utterance; as such the 
genre also includes a certain typical kind o f  expression that inheres in it. In the genre the 
word acquires a particular typical expression. G enres correspond to typical situations o f  
speech com m unication, typical them es, and, consequently, also to particular contacts 
between the meanings o f  words and actual concrete reality under certain typical circum ­
stances.
There are many similarities between Bakhtin’s treatment of speech 
genre and utterance and the account of genre and performance, which 
Scribner invoked to develop her notion of a logical genre. As is the case 
in Hymes’s account, Bakhtin’s approach emphasizes that genres are asso­
ciated with particular kinds of situations. This, of course, was an essen­
tial point for Scribner in her attem pt to deal with the fact that the logical 
genre is so closely tied to experience in a particular institutional setting -  
formal schooling. It is the mediating role of genres that creates the link 
between individuals’ performances or utterances on the one hand and 
institutional settings on the other. Furtherm ore, both Bakhtin and 
Hymes focus on the tension between a genre, which is “impersonal” 
(Bakhtin 1986, p. 88), and the utterances produced by appropriating a 
genre. Every utterance occurs in a unique way in a concrete setting and 
hence has personalized and contextualized properties specific to it and it 
alone.
T he essential contribution Bakhtin’s ideas make to this general line of 
inquiry derives from his account of “dialogism.” As authors such as 
Holquist (1990) and Todorov (1984) have noted, dialogism, or dialogical- 
ity, is the most fundamental theoretical construct in Bakhtin’s approach. 
It is a notion that is analytically prior even to that of the utterance or 
voice since the production of utterances always involves a speaker’s 
appropriating, invoking, or ventriloquating through the voices of others, 
thereby entering into a dialogic encounter with them. T he fundamental 
Bakhtinian question is, Who is doing the speaking?, and the fundamental 
Bakhtinian answer is, At least two voices. This claim about “multivoiced­
ness” comes through very clearly in Bakhtin’s (1986, p. 78) comments on 
speech genres.
We speak only in definite speech genres, that is, all our utterances have definite and rela­
tively stable typical form s o f  construction o f  the whole. Our repertoire o f  oral (and written) 
speech genres is rich. W e use them confidently and skillfully in practice, and it is quite 
possible for us not even to suspect their existence in theory. Like M oliere’s M onsieur  
Jourdain who, when speaking in prose, had no idea that was what he was doing, wc speak 
in diverse speech genres w ithout suspecting that they exist. Even in the m ost free, the 
m ost unconstrained conversation, we cast our speech in definite generic forms, som e­
times rigid and trite ones, som etim es more flexible, plastic, and creative ones.
In this view it is no more possible to produce an utterance without invok­
ing a speech genre than it is possible to produce an utterance without 
invoking a “national language” such as English, French, or Thai.
T he resulting picture is one in which speaking is inherently a process 
of appropriating the words of others, be they concrete, identifiable other 
individuals or groups of others, as in the case of “social languages” 
(Wertsch 1991). Speech is therefore a form of mediated action in which 
speech genres (along with other aspects of language) serve as mediational 
means. As is the case with all forms of mediated action (W ertsch 1991) 
this implies that there is an inherent and irreducible tension between the 
mediational means, that is, an “impersonal” tool, on the one hand, and 
the unique and personal use or instantiation of this tool in a concrete 
performance, on the other. In Bakhtinian terms
Our speech, that is, all our utterances (including creative works), is filled with others’ 
words, varying degrees o f  otherness or varying degrees o f  “our-ow n-ness,” varying 
degrees o f  awareness and detachm ent. T h ese  words o f  others carry with them  their own 
expression, their own evaluative tone, w hich we assimilate, rework, and re-accentuate. 
(Bakhtin 1986, p. 89)
S peech  genres an d  th e  log ical g en re
A complete account of the implications of Bakhtin’s claims for 
Scribner’s account of literacy would need to address two basic issues. 
First, it would need to produce a more complete explication of speech 
genres in general and of the genres associated with literacy in particular. 
What are the specific properties of speech genres used in literacy prac­
tice? How do they differ from other speech genres? Second, the problem 
of how these speech genres can be appropriated in unique performances 
needs to be addressed. W hat processes are involved in invoking or 
ventriloquating through a speech genre in order to produce concrete ut­
terances? How do these processes vary depending on contextual factors?
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These two research agendas may be distinguished analytically and 
hence investigated, at least to some degree, independently. This is so 
even though they must eventually be related in order not to lose sight of 
the irreducible connection between mediational means and their use, a 
point Bakhtin was alluding to in his critique of traditional linguistic anal­
yses when he noted that “speech can exist in reality only in the form of 
concrete utterances” (1986, p. 71). In what follows, we shall focus pri­
marily on issues of mapping out the properties of speech genres used in 
literacy practice and spend less time on the dynamics of their use (for the 
latter, see Wertsch & O ’Connor, 1994). In particular, we shall be con­
cerned with ways in which Scribner’s “logical genre” might shape speak­
ing and thinking processes.
On the basis of her review of several studies of verbal logical problems, 
Scribner (1977) argued that the major difference between schooled and 
nonschooled participants was that the former tended to use only that 
information explicitly provided by the experimenter, whereas the non­
schooled participants’ answers often reflected a tendency to take other 
information into consideration.
T h e critical factor [in the perform ance o f  the nonschooled subjects] is that the ‘evidence  
use by the subject’, in many cases . . . bore little resem blance to the evidence supplied in 
the experim ental problem . Cole et al. (1971, p. 188) concluded: ‘T h e  subjects were (or 
seem  to have been) responding to conventional situations in which their past experience 
dictated the answer. . . .  In short, it appears that the particular verbal context and content 
dictate the response rather than the arbitrarily im posed relations am ong the elem ents in 
the problem .’ (Scribner 1977, p. 488)
Further analyses by Scribner suggest that the pattern of nonschooled 
subjects’ performance was not attributable to faulty logical procedures or 
logical procedures that were even qualitatively distinct from those em­
ployed by the schooled subjects. Instead, the differences between 
schooled and nonschooled participants derived from different patterns 
in what they took to be the content on which operations were to be per­
formed.
In her analysis of studies that specifically asked participants to justify 
or explain their answers, Scribner employed a distinction between “theo­
retical” and “empirical” explanations. Theoretical explanations were 
defined as being based strictly on information supplied by the experi­
menter, whereas empirical explanations were defined as being based on 
information that the subjects themselves introduced. As an example of
this distinction Scribner gives the following problem and types of expla­
nation:
All people who own houses pay a house tax.
Boim a does not pay a house tax.
D oes Boima own a house?
A theoretical justification: ‘If you say Boim a does not pay a house tax, he cannot own a 
house.’ An empirical explanation: 'Boim a does not have m oney to pay a house tax.’ (1977, 
p. 489)
Scribner found that by incorporating the distinction between empirical 
and theoretical explanations into the analysis of data from several studies 
the differences between schooled and nonschooled participants became 
even more pronounced:
N onschooled villagers overw helm ingly support their answers by appeals to fact, b elief or 
opinion [i.e., facts known to them  but not explicitly stated by the experim ent]. . . . T h is  
appeal to real world knowledge and experience, which for the time being we. will call 
‘empirical bias’, is the single m ost prom inent characteristic o f  villagers’ performance. 
(1977, pp. 489 -490)
As Scribner notes, an empirical bias does not disappear completely 
from the reasoning of even very highly educated individuals. F urther­
more, she was certainly not implying that it should disappear from the 
thinking processes of individuals as they go about their everyday busi­
ness in a variety of activity settings, only one of which may be formal 
schooling. Instead, the implicit claim is that the logical genre is one tool 
in a “cultural tool kit” (W ertsch 1991) that emerges in response to partic­
ipating in certain activity settings. Instead of replacing other cultural 
tools, orm ediational means, the emergence of the logical genre is more 
likely to add to the “heterogeneity” (Tulviste 1991) of this took kit, a het­
erogeneity that reflects the “activity relativism” (Tulviste 1991) of socio­
cultural settings in which humans live.
In the particular case of Scribner’s logical genre, a defining property of 
the mediational means is a distinction between what we shall term “acti­
vated” and “nonactivated” information. When schooled participants in­
voked the logical genre to solve syllogisms, activated information was 
defined as that information which has been explicitly stated by the exper­
imenter. Nonactivated information was any other information known to 
either the experimenter or subject or both, but information that had not
284 James V. Wertsch, Fran Hags tr om, (ž  Eve Kikas
15
Voices o f  thinking and speaking 285
been made known through the explicit statements of the experimenter. 
In this particular context, because it was not made known through such 
explicit assertions, it was deemed irrelevant to the task.
At first glance it might appear that the distinction between activated 
and nonactivated information is grounded in an objective assessment of 
what information is available (through explicit statements or otherwise) 
to the interlocutors in a context. Such a view would parallel assumptions 
that underlie accounts of given versus new information (Halliday 1967; 
Chafe 1974, 1976; Clark and Haviland 1977), psychological subject ver­
sus psychological predicate (Vygotsky 1987), and so forth. In these 
accounts the focus is on how information is established in consciousness 
or in the context of speaking and how this “given information” is then 
used as the foundation for interaction.
It is certainly true that knowledge of given information plays a role in 
producing and understanding utterances and is a necessary factor in 
determining what counts as activated information. Specifically, if some­
thing is not given information -  the psychological subject, the theme, 
and so forth -  it cannot be activated information. However, not all given 
information is activated in the sense of “activated” that we are using. The 
distinction between activated and nonactivated information differs from 
the others in an essential way. T his is because the distinction between 
activated and nonactivated information is grounded not only in what 
information is available for one reason or another in a discourse setting, 
but in the speech genre as well. T hat is, specific speech genres entail specific 
assumptions about what is activated and nonactivated information, and this 
fact often operates independently of whether or not the interlocutors in a 
speech context share knowledge of certain information.
T he difference we are talking about here concerns relationships 
between utterances and their contexts. On the one hand, utterances must 
occur in some already existing context and as a result have certain pre­
suppositions. Notions such as given information, psychological subject, 
and theme are grounded in this observation. On the other hand, making 
an utterance defines or transforms this context in some way. This is the 
“performative” or “creative” dimension of speaking analyzed by theo­
rists such as Austin (1962) and Silverstein (1976, 1985). The specific 
claim we wish to make derives from the observation that producing an 
utterance involves a speech genre and any speech genre shapes the cre­
ative dimension of utterances in certain ways. O f particular interest at
this point is that the invocation of a particular speech genre carries with 
it a specific assignment of activated and nonactivated information, and 
this assignment may be independent of the given-new distinction.
As an illustration of this claim, consider the examples reviewed by 
Scribner in her account of what she called the logical genre. The major 
difference between schooled and nonschooled participants in the studies 
she reviewed was that the former were more likely to operate solely on 
the basis of activated information (in this case defined as information 
explicitly provided by the experimenter), whereas the nonschooled par­
ticipants tended to take other information into account. The fact that 
activated information is defined in the context of this speech genre as 
that information explicitly provided by the experimenter cannot be 
reduced to facts about what the experimenter and subject knew in gen­
eral and how their knowledge overlaps. For example, in the case of the 
syllogism about Boima, both the experimenter and subject may have in 
fact known that “Boima does not have money to pay a house tax” (Scrib­
ner 1977, p. 489). However, by invoking the logical genre, this shared 
background knowledge is not defined as activated information and hence 
is deemed irrelevant when drawing a conclusion.
Scribner’s “theoretical” explanations are associated with invoking her 
logical genre and hence using activated information as defined by this 
genre, whereas “empirical” explanations are associated with using non­
activated information (in some cases alongside activated information). 
Similarly, the definition of the “empirical bias” derives from the distinc­
tion between activated and nonactivated information, and again this dis­
tinction is grounded in the invocation of the logical genre and not from 
some distinction between types of information, which has an indepen­
dent, objective existence. The mastery of this genre therefore involves 
mastery of a particular distinction between activated and nonactivated 
information.
The essential point here is that the difference between activated and 
nonactivated information is not grounded in some objective property of 
the information itself. Instead, it is grounded in the properties of the 
speech genre used to carry out the mediated action at issue. By invoking 
the logical speech genre, one creates a very circumscribed discourse 
space in which certain information is defined as irrelevant independently 
of what the interlocutors might actually know or share as background 
information. As a result, what counts as an empirical explanation cannot
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be determined by analyses of information that do not take into account 
the particular distinction between activated and nonactivated informa­
tion entailed by the particular speech genre at issue. In cases involving 
Scribner’s logical genre, this means that information invoked to produce 
an empirical explanation could have produced a theoretical explanation if  
it had been explicitly stated by the experimenter rather than deriving 
from some other source.
T he logical genre and  literacy  activ ity
As we argued earlier, Scribner was utilizing a kind of activity- 
oriented approach to issues in literacy several years before she explicitly 
invoked ideas and terms from others’ activity theories. In our view much 
of her career was devoted to developing an activity theory approach to a 
range of phenomena. In general, this approach was grounded in the 
claim that mental processes of individuals can be understood only by 
understanding how they fit into culturally, historically, and institution­
ally situated activity. Scribner pursued this claim by examining concrete 
forms of practice, or action, with one eye toward their psychological cor­
relates and the other toward the sociocultural settings in which they 
occurred. As noted earlier, this line of reasoning is consistent with the 
perspective Vygotsky was developing near the end of his career when he 
expanded his notion of scientific concepts to say that such concepts must 
be understood in terms of their role in discourse peculiar to formal 
instructional settings rather than in terms of more narrowly defined 
social processes.
Given this context of concerns and issues, Scribner’s account of the 
logical genre can be seen to have major implications for how we can 
understand literacy activity. Specifically, it raises the question of what it 
is in literacy practice that might lead to differences between schooled and 
nonschooled people’s approaches to syllogistic reasoning. Neither Scrib­
ner nor others have argued that it is extensive practice with tasks that are 
explicitly organized in syllogistic form that has this effect. With a few 
possible exceptions (e.g., story problems in mathematics), there seem to 
be few direct parallels between the requirements of syllogistic reasoning 
tasks and those of ongoing literacy practices in the classroom.
Instead, we would argue that the patterns of using the logical genre 
Scribner found derive from extensive experiences with various forms of 
the distinction between activated and nonactivated information. In con-
trast to the relatively simple and clear distinction entailed when invoking 
the logical genre to solve syllogisms (a distinction grounded in what has 
been explicitly stated in the immediate context), this distinction is often 
less; simple and less clear in classroom discourse. However, it is no less 
strongly imposed. This latter fact is an indication that it has one of the 
major properties of a. cultural tool, or mediational means, in an account 
of mediated action. It is socioculturally situated in the sense that it is pre­
ferred, or “privileged” (Wertsch 1991), over others in a particular cul­
tural, institutional, and historical setting.
In contrast to the experimental settings reviewed by Scribner (1977), 
the distinction between activated and nonactivated information in class­
room discourse does not rest on whether something has been explicitly 
stated in the immediate context. Instead of this relatively simple and 
clear criterion for making the distinction, the speech genres found in 
classroom discourse tend to be grounded in a more general distinction 
between activated and nonactivated information. It is certainly true that 
something may be activated information by virtue of its just having been 
stated, but many other criteria seem to be used as well. For example, 
information that has been covered in previous classroom discourse, 
information that comes from shared background reading, and informa­
tion from other sources that are presumed to be shared all may qualify as 
activated information.
However, as in the case of Scribner’s logical genre, the distinction 
between activated and nonactivated information cannot be reduced to 
what is shared background and what is not. It always involves the ele­
ment of contextual creativity or performativity, and what is created is 
conventionally associated with the speech genre. Thus, to master a 
speech genre is to master a particular distinction between activated and 
nonactivated information.
The specifics of this line of reasoning are obviously still in the process 
of being worked out. However, the general framework of the argument 
has begun to emerge quite clearly, thanks to the insights of scholars such 
as Scribner. Indeed, Scribner’s career can be understood as a continuing 
attempt to address the complex issues of a theory of activity that would 
allow us to understand relationships between human mental processes 
and sociocultural setting. For her, a starting point was the claim that 
human mental processes are best understood in terms of human action. 
Given that such action always occurs in cultural, institutional, and his­
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torical contexts, she was constantly led to address the issue of how men­
tal functioning is inherently socioculturally situated.
Scribner’s elaboration of these claims generated insights that will be 
the focus of research and action programs for years to come. The fact 
that her ideas continue to appeal to people from such an array of profes­
sional and cultural backgrounds speaks volumes about the ingenious 
insights she brought to her work. Perhaps even more importantly, this 
appeal reflects the deep commitment she had to respecting the perspec­
tives of the weak as well as the powerful. Her convincing demonstrations 
that there is more than one intelligent way to understand the world 
around us provides an important starting point for pursuing one of her 
deepest desires -  to make the world a better place for all of us.
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THE IMPACT OF TEACHING ON STUDENTS’ 
DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
Eve Kikas
University of Tartu, Department of Psychology
A longitudinal study of the influence of education on children’s ability to define and 
explain astronomical concepts (equator, axis, orbit, day/night variations and seasonal 
changes) was carried out. An initial analysis was conducted of the way the topics were 
covered in the textbook and taught in the classroom. Subsequently twenty students (aged 
10-11 years) were interviewed two months after being taught the topics and again four 
years later in order to establish the impact of the teaching on their ability to define and 
explain the concepts correctly. The results indicated that after two months the students 
were able to recall the scientific explanations given in the lesson and the textbook but 
that after four years they could only give “everyday” non scientific and inaccurate ex­
planations.
Introduction
This longitudinal investigation was aimed to determine the influence of education on 
children’s definitions of astronomy concepts (equator, axis, orbit) and explanations of 
phenomena (day/night variation and seasonal changes) over time. Astronomy is a field 
where everyday models differ quite substantially from scientific explanations of physical 
phenomena. Therefore, they are good indicators of the interface between the two.
We could show the strong impact of teaching on students’ definitions and explana­
tions shortly after learning the topics in school. But students only memorized the school 
knowledge without integrating into their everyday knowledge and returned to everyday 
explanations 4 years later.
The impact of education on thinking
Logical arguments and well- defined conceptual systems are characteristic of scientific 
thinking. It has been shown that scientific thinking does not develop without schooling 
(Luria, 1976; Tulviste, 1991; Scribner & Cole, 1981). Different reasons for this devel­
opment have been offered.
Essentially schooling occurs through the medium of verbal instruction and therefore 
falls outside everyday personal experiences. Therefore, as Tulviste writes: “Supra- 
empirical connections are possible (and obligatory) between scientific concepts them­
selves but not between their referents” (1991, p. 162). Verbal explanations and logical 
arguments are of great importance in school (Vygotsky, 1962; Wertsch, 1991). As exact 
usage of terms is necessary to solve school (scientific) tasks, students have to understand 
abstract definitions (Kikas, 1993; Tulviste, 1991). Definitions make explicit the implicit 
meanings underlying the use of words in ordinary discourse, and this explicit meaning 
can be analyzed and revised. Also, causal explanations and logical arguments are used in 
scientific discussions and also in school. Many studies have shown that the extent to 
which children can use abstract terms to define concepts grows with age (e.g., Benelli,
Arcuri & Marchesini, 1988; Kikas, 1993; Markowitz & Franz 1988; Watson, 1985). If 
there is no need in later life to solve such problems, scientific thinking (including the 
ability to define abstractly) may decline (Luria, 1976; Rabinovitz & Mandler 1983; 
Tulviste, 1991).
A specific speech genre — the language of “official science” (Wertsch, 1991; also 
called the “literate register”, Watson, 1985; Snow, 1990) — should be used in school. 
Students learn to speak in this new genre. Several researchers make use of the idea of 
“talking science”: students should be able to talk science to be able to participate in sci­
entific discussions (Howe, Tolmie & Rodgers, 1.992; Lemke, 1990). Lemke argues: 
“Classroom language is not just a list of technical terms, or even just a recital of defini­
tions. It is the use of those terms in relation to one another, across a wide variety of 
contexts. Students have to learn how to combine the meanings of different terms ac­
cording to the accepted ways of talking science” (1990, p. 12). Descriptions of phenom­
ena are used as far as phenomena are directly observable but explanations of unobserv­
able entities become important in scientific language. Abstract definitions are also char­
acteristic of the language of official science (Wertsch, 1991) or talking science (Lemke,
1990). So, while learning in school, students are urged to talk in a language of “official 
science”. Accordingly, their ability to define abstractly and use logical arguments should 
improve.
Children’s naive theories and science education
Recent studies have shown that children’s knowledge falls into (naive) theories (mental 
models) (Carey, 1985; Keil, 1989; Neisser, 1987; Vosniadou, 1992; Vosniadou & 
Brewer, 1994). These models are derived from children’s everyday perception. It has 
been argued that their structure is an analogue to the states of the world it represents and 
that they provide explanations of physical phenomena (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994).
Scientific knowledge consists of representations of natural phenomena (in the form 
of theories, laws, principles) and is taught to children in school. Children’s personal 
knowledge varies in the degree to which it is consistent with scientific knowledge 
(Glynn & Duit, 1995). In fact it appears that young children’s mental models are very 
difficult to change in school especially if they essentially differ from scientific explana­
tions and therefore radical knowledge restructuring is inevitable (Chi, Slotta & Leeuw, 
1994; Driver, Guesne & Tiberhgien, 1985; Neisser, 1987; Vosniadou, 1992; 
Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994; White, 1983). It has been found that essentially children 
learn from school the knowledge that does not contradict their everyday experiences. 
Sometimes they make a compromise, forming synthetic models (also called misconcep­
tions): “They change their mental models in a way that allows them to retain as many as 
possible of their experiential beliefs without contradicting adult teachings” (Vosniadou, 
1992, p. 352). Cognitive scientists have paid little attention to the exact reasons why 
knowledge restructuring had not occurred during learning and have not studied textbook 
and lesson discourse.
In contrast the impact of instruction and teaching methods has been studied exten­
sively in educational psychology. Initially these studies were based on the need to im­
prove science education.
There has been a widely held view in education that the textbook plays a dominant 
role in science teaching (i.e., science curriculum is textbook-centered) (Stinner, 1995).
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These textbooks emphasize memorizing new information (facts, definitions, explana­
tions) and learning answers rather than exploring questions (Stinner, 1995; Glynn, 
Yeany & Britton, 1991; Michaels & Bruce, 1989). It has been shown that this new in­
formation does not take into account students’ previous (naive) conceptions (Michaels & 
Bruce, 1989; Renner, Abraham & Grzybowsky, 1990). The textbooks’ explanations are 
usually so inadequate, sometimes with logical contradictions, that it is impossible to 
learn from the text alone (Michaels & Bruce 1989; Pizzini, Shepardson & Abell, 1992).
In their instruction and teaching, teachers heavily rely on the textbook (Stinner, 
1995; Driscoll etal., 1994; Yore, 1991). Traditional textbooks encourage the teachers to 
use the instructional mode of lecture, question, and answer. Teachers deliver the facts, 
definitions and explanations and the students’ task is to memorize them in order to know 
the answer to the evaluative questions. The question is whether such kind of teaching is 
enough to produce meaningful learning and real understanding of the phenomena.
The benefits of more student-centered (or student-active) forms of teaching and 
learning have been shown (Gillies & Ashman, 1995; Bergqvist & Säljö, 1994; Wistedt, 
1994). The meaningful learning of science involves active constructing of conceptual 
models by relating new knowledge to existing experiences (Glynn & Duit, 1995). Sev­
eral studies have shown how learning is maximized if children explore their models 
(naive explanations) in discussions (with peers) (Howe, Tolmie & Rodgers, 1992; Tol- 
mie et ah, 1993).
Mental models and education in astronomy
Children’s everyday experience provides them with enough information to develop their 
own models of astronomical phenomena (e.g., they see the Sun moving in the sky). Even 
more, the everyday expressions commonly used in Estonia give countenance to the ac­
quisition of these models (e.g., “the Sun rises”, “the Sun goes to sleep”). Nowadays 
theories of astronomy differ radically from the naive models that children construct on 
the basis of their experience and everyday language usage. In fact theories in astronomy 
as a scientific discipline have undergone a radical restructuring in the course of the de­
velopment. There is a noticeable similarity between children’s mental models of astron­
omy and the explanations found in history: young children’s mental models are similar 
to theories used in ancient and medieval times.
Vosniadou and her colleagues have studied the concepts of astronomy beginning 
from preschool children up to adults. They have shown that the majority of children 
have well-defined and consistent mental models (Vosniadou, 1992; Vosniadou & 
Brewer, 1992; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994). Vosniadou and Brewer (1994) found that 
38 students out of 60 (1st, 3rd and 5th graders, 6-11 years old) had coherent day/night 
variation explanations and used their models consistently. They differentiated within
3 types of models. Initial models are derived and consistent with the observations of 
everyday life (the Sun is covered by clouds or darkness; day is replaced by night; the 
Sun goes out at night; the Sun goes behind hills). Synthetic models are the attempts to 
integrate scientific and everyday information (the Earth goes around the Sun; the Moon 
blocks the Sun; the Sun moves in the space, the Sun and Moon move; the Earth rotates 
up/down; the Earth rotates and revolves). Scientific models agree with the view that the 
Earth spins. They found that 1st graders generally have initial models, during elementary 
school years they replace it with synthetic models and afterwards with scientific models.
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Baxter (1995), studying twenty 9-16 year-old children, also found developmental 
differences: younger children usually stated that the Sun revolved around the Earth and 
the older that the Earth spinned. But even 15-16 year olds answered that the Earth re­
volved around the Sun or the Sun revolved around the Earth. The most popular explana­
tion of seasonal changes was that the Sun was further away during winter.
Sadler (1987), studying twenty five 9th graders, found that the students who were 
completing a scientific course in astronomy did not give more correct answers than those 
who were not. Still, they used more scientific terms (orbit, tilt etc). How the topic had 
been taught in school was not described in his work. Michaels and Bruce (1989) stud­
ied 4th grade students’ explanations of seasonal changes. They found that after reading 
the text and having a lengthy discussion and demonstration by the teacher, not a single 
student learned the correct explanation of what causes the seasons to change. The wide­
spread explanation of the seasonal changes was a “distance theory” (the temperature 
changes because of the distance between the Earth and the Sun changes), drawn from 
everyday life (the closer to heat sources the warmer it is). But several students gave per­




This investigation was part of a cross-cultural study carried out in collaboration with 
Michaels and Bruce at the Literacy Institute (Cambridge, MA, USA) — see below 
stages 1-31. Only the Estonian study was longitudinal: we repeated the interviewing 
4 years later — see below stage 4.
Michaels and Bruce gathered data in a typical U.S. multiethnic fourth-grade class­
room. As the topics “Day and night variation” and “Seasonal changes” are taught in all 
Estonian public schools in the 5th grade, we had to do the study in this grade.
Our investigation took place in a usual Estonian secondary school in Tartu (the sec­
ond largest town in Estonia, population approximately 120 000, 16 schools). The first 
part of the study (see below, stages 1-3) was carried out in the fall of 1989 in one of the 
5th grade classes. There were 22 students (age 10-11) in the class, all of them were in­
terviewed in December 1989. The second interviews took place in December 1994. The 
same 20 students (grade 9, age 14-15) participated in the interviews, 2 had left the 
school.
Procedure
The procedure used was as follows:
1. Analyzing textbook discourse. We studied the structure and content of the text 
and the types of exercises that were given in a workbook. Special attention was paid to 
the ways the terms were defined and phenomena explained.
2. Analyzing lesson discourse. The lessons where the topic was studied (grade 5) 
were observed, videotaped and transcribed.
1 We introduced the results of this comparative study in the 5th European Conference on Devel­
opmental Psychology in Seville, Spain (6-9 Sept., 1992).
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We studied the structure of the lessons and the activities that occurred. We compared 
the teacher’s explanations with the book’s version and analyzed the teacher’s questions. 
We looked for the ways students could actively participate in the lessons (ask questions, 
talk about their experience, use their knowledge).
3. Interviewing students two months after studying the topic in school. The in­
terviewer and a student sat alone in a room. The conversation was open-ended and re­
laxed. The framework of the interview was always the same. The interview began with 
asking some version of the following questions:
1. What makes the days longer in the summer than in the winter? What makes it hotter 
in the summer and colder in the winter?
2. If you went south from Tartu (and farther and farther), what would happen to the 
temperature?
3. When it is summer in Tartu, is it summer everywhere in the world?
4. Why do seasons of the year change?
5. Why do night and day change?
6. What is equator?
7. What is axis?
8. What is orbit?
The interviewer asked frequent follow-up questions (“Say more about that”, “What 
makes that happen?”) to be sure that she understood what the students were saying and 
thinking. Each interview lasted at least 15 minutes.
In this paper, the answers to the last five questions were analyzed because these were 
the questions (from the above) that were asked by the teacher in the lessons to assess 
children’s factual knowledge.
4. Interviewing the same students 4 years after studying the topic in school. The 
conversation took place in the same room. The framework of the interview was the 
same.
Results 
Teaching the topic in school
Textbook discourse
Astronomy is taught in science lessons. Estonian schools have a science textbook 
(Nilson & Tiits, 1988) and a workbook (Nilson & Tiits, 1989). The themes “Day and 
night variation” and “Seasonal changes” are studied as parts of a wider topic “Outer 
Space”. Under this topic, there are 5 subtopics and a summary:
1. Celestial Bodies (2 pages of text with 1 figure and 12 questions; 7 new terms with 
definitions in the textbook, 4 exercises in the workbook).
2. Planetary System (3 pages, 2 figures, 8 questions, 4 new terms, 3 exercises).
3. Day and Night Variation (3.5 pages, 3 figures, 8 questions, 2 new terms, 6 exer­
cises).
4. Seasonal Changes (3.5 pages, 3 figures, 7 questions, 2 new terms, 7 exercises).
5. The Moon. Exploration of the Outer Space (3 pages, 1 figure, 9 questions, 4 new 
terms, 5 exercises).
6. Summary (1.5 pages, 24 questions on the whole topic).
The emphasis is on definitions of terms and long descriptions of phenomena. A total 
of 18 new terms are introduced and defined (including axis, poles, the Earth’s rotation
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and revolution, orbit, equator, the Northern and the Southern Hemisphere). The parts 
that are stressed are printed in bold and separately. Sixteen definitions including the 
definitions of axis, orbit and equator are emphasized by bold print. Also, the explana­
tions of seasonal and day/night changes are printed in bold. These definitions and expla­
nations are given in Table 1 by bold print.
Insert Table 1 about here
The book’s explanations take into account neither children’s naive theories (e.g., that 
the Sun revolves around the Earth) nor stress the critical knowledge necessary for under­
standing scientific explanations (e.g., how it is possible that the Earth revolves and ro­
tates but we do not see or feel it).
Lesson discourse
The students studied the whole topic “Outer Space” in the beginning of the 5th grade 
in the course of 7 lessons.
The lessons’ activities grouped into five major blocks: checking the material learnt at 
home, introducing new material, reading the book, checking the new material, solving 
the problems. The topics studied, the main activities and their duration (in percentage) in 
each lesson are given in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
The introduction (16% of lesson on average) was given orally by the teacher. In it, 
she always briefly retold the text and (if possible) demonstrated phenomena with the 
help of the globe. The teacher followed the book’s explanations very closely.
After this introduction, students had to read the same topic from the textbook. They 
read silently (13% of all time) and did not ask the teacher any questions.
During checking both the new and learnt at home material (on average 47% of les­
son), the teacher asked questions on the topic and students answered. She expected an­
swers to be quite short and the same as in the book. The teacher’s talk was much longer 
than students’ answers. For example:2
Teacher Why do we have day and night? What are the reasons of this variation?
Who knows? Tom.
Tom The Earth moves.
Teacher How does the Earth move? We have talked about several movements.
What movement causes the day and night variation?
Tom Around its axis.
Teacher Say it once more. The day and night...
Tom The day and night variate because the Earth moves around its axis.
Teacher What do we say? How do we name the movements around the axis? It 
is not a simple movement we say that...
Tom (No answer)
Teacher Andy, please.
Andy The Earth rotates around its axis.
Teacher Yes, it is called rotation. But is it all? The question was why we do 
have day and night. What else must we say to explain why we have 
day and night?
Andy The Sun shines only to one half of the Earth. Where the Sun shines there is 
day and where there is no Sun there is night.
Teacher Yes, that’s right.
2 Children’s names have been changed.
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The problems from workbook were solved together with the whole class (24% of les­
son): the teacher read a task and asked someone to solve it, all the students wrote the 
answer in their workbooks. The teacher also lectured on the topic when checking the 
material and solving the problems. So the majority of students had no need to think 
about the problems, they simply waited for someone to verbalize the answer.
All the lessons were very formal and traditional — as opposed to open ones — 
(Gaconia, 1987) and teacher-centered — as opposed to learner-centered — (Withall, 
1987). Students sat quite passively at their desks, mainly responding to the teacher’s 
questions. The teacher talked to the whole class or asked questions from separate stu­
dents. Students listened to the teacher’s talk, read the book and answered the questions. 
There was no discussion either between peers or between students and the teacher. Chil­
dren memorized the book’s words. They had no opportunity to compare or integrate the 
knowledge learnt at school into their personal knowledge. The only question about stu­
dents’ earlier knowledge was “What constellations do you know?” No deeper 




Students’ definitions of the terms “equator”, “orbit” and “axis” were analyzed. There 
are several ways to classify definitions (Kikas, 1993; Litowitz, 1977; Markowitz & 
Franz, 1988). We divided the definitions into two categories (see Snow, 1990).
1. More or less correct answers (for short: “correct”). Here, abstract definitions 
(also called formal and conceptual) give category (e.g., “Axis is a line...”), in more ad­
vanced cases descriptive attributes are added (e.g., “Axis is an imaginary line that goes 
through the center of the Earth”). Descriptive definitions with hypothetical markers 
“that” and “which” instead of naming a Superordinate category (e.g., “Axis is that which 
goes through the Earth”) are also included here. In such definitions, the idea is correct, 
but not the form. Just abstract answers with descriptive attributes were given in the book 
and generally demanded in lessons. Sometimes, the teacher was satisfied even with de­
scriptive answers.
2. “Others” include too broad (e.g., “Axis is tilted a little”) and wrong answers but 
also omissions (“I don’t know”).
All the students’ answers and the number of answers in each category both in 5th and 
9th grades are given in Table 1.
It is seen from the table that 5th grade students gave mainly “correct” answers 
(43 “correct” versus 17 “other” answers). Even more, their answers were mainly those 
given in the textbook (i.e., giving category relationship with descriptive attributes). The 
majority of “other” answers were confusing terms (e.g., giving the definition of axis for 
the orbit). The 9th grade students gave less “correct” and more “other” answers 
(31 “correct” versus 29 “other” answers). The majority of “other” answers were omis­
sions, i.e. statements “I don’t know”.
Between-grade changes in students’ definition categories were studied. McNemar’s 
chi-square test showed that the change (in “correct”-“other” answers) was statistically 
significant only for the term equator (%2(1)=4.17; p<0.05); both other changes are statis­
19 7
tically nonsignificant (p>0.05). This indicates that there was a consistency over time in 
the use of either “correct” or “other” answers.
There was a consistency in defining different terms (i.e., using the same category — 
either “correct” or “other” — answer) by each child. McNemar’s test showed that the 
change was statistically significant only for terms orbit-equator in the 5th grade 
(%2(1)=4.2, p<0.05), all other changes were nonsignificant (p>0.05). So students tend to 
use the same category answers in defining different terms.
Explanations
Students’ explanations of the reasons for day/night variation and seasonal changes 
were analyzed. Proceeding from the empirical data, the explanations were divided into 
five (sub)categories which grouped into two major categories. These latter categories 
were used in the analyses.
1. “Earth-movements” (heliocentric) answers explain the phenomena by the 
movements of the Earth. Here, “Exact” answers contain more or less exact textbook 
explanation (see Table 1), which was also demanded in the lessons. In “All” answers the 
student relates all s/he remembers, explaining reasons for either day/night variation or 
seasonal changes (or both) by the fact that the Earth revolves around the axis and around 
the Sun. In “Mixed” answers the student confuses the reasons for day/night and sea­
sonal changes.
2. “Others”. Here, “Sun-movements” (geocentric)(for short: “Sun”) answers 
give the reason for changes in the Sun rotating around the Earth. It is also a causal ex­
planation but actually wrong: it is taught in school that not the Sun but the Earth re- 
volves around'. Descriptive answers do not give any causal (physical) reason for the 
change but describe what can be seen or felt. A “Sun”-explanation is synthetic, descrip­
tive an everyday (initial) explanation (see Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994).
All the students’ answers and the number of answers in each category both in the 5th 
and 9th grades are given in Table 1. It can be seen from the table that 5th grade students 
explored the textbook’s knowledge in their explanations. Overall, there were 35 “Earth- 
movements” (23 “exact”, 4 “all” and 8 “mixed”) and only 5 “other” (1 “Sun” and 
4 “descriptive”) answers. The majority of explanations were like those written in the 
textbook and demanded in lessons (i.e., “exact”). Explanations were quite similar to 
each other, more or less in the book’s words. Children’s answers differed in how well 
they had remembered the differences between the Earth’s rotation around it’s axis and 
around the Sun: some children confused the explanations for day/night and the seasonal 
changes, some could not distinguish between exact reasons for changes and, therefore, 
related everything they remembered.
When these students were in the 9th grade, their answers were very different. There 
were 23 “Earth-movements” (8 “exact”, 4 “all” and 7 “mixed”) and 17 “other” 
(14 “Sun” and 3 “descriptive”) answers. The mostly used explanation in this grade was 
“Sun-movements” (“day and night/seasons change because the Sun rotates around the 
Earth”).
3 At least, it is wrong in school context. It was stressed many times in the lessons that the Earth 
revolves around the Sun. According both to Galilean and Einsteinian relativity theory, it is the 
same either to say that the Earth revolves around the Sun or the Sun around the Earth. But there is 
a difference between the easiness and convenience in describing these revolutions. Clearly the 
Sun’s revolution alone does not cause day/night variation.
Between-grade changes in explanations were studied. McNemar test showed that the 
difference was statistically significant for both explanations; %2(1)=4.17, p<0.05. Relia­
bly more students gave “other” (“descriptive” and “Sun”) and not “Earth-movements” 
explanations answering to the questions “Why do day/night or seasons change” in the 
9th grade.
There was a high consistency (i.e., using the same category — either school-based or 
“other” — answer) in explanations for day/night and seasonal changes in both grades. 
McNemar’s test showed that the change in “Earth-movements”- “other” explanations 
was nonsignificant in both grades (p=1.00). Therefore, students tend to explain both 
phenomena relatedly, in the same manner, either using “Earth-movements” or “other” 
explanations (see Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994).
Qualitative analysis
We studied how well students explored their ideas, how consistent they were in their 
discussions and whether there were qualitative differences between grades. It was found 
from the interviews that the 5th grade children relied mainly on the textbook and an­
swered as briefly as possible (as it was demanded in lessons). If they were not sure they 
answered very quickly: “I don’t know”. Only after several questions would it turn out 
that they knew but were afraid to make a mistake. Others related everything they could 
remember. For example:
Interviewer Tell me, why day and night change?
Ann Because the Earth rotates around its axis and around the Sun.
Interviewer Oh yes. But can you explain the variation in more detail. What 
movement exactly causes the variation?
Ann The Earth rotates around its axis and then one side of the Earth is
toward the Sun and there is day. But the Earth also revolves around 
the Sun.
Interviewer Yes, that’s right. But are both movements necessary for us to have 
day and night?
Ann No, the Earth’s revolution around the Sun causes the seasonal
changes.
There were more pauses and hesitations in the 9th grade. Students did not remember the 
book’s text any more, they had to try to call from memory, base on their everyday expe­
riences, make conclusions. For example (an interview with the same student):
Interviewer Tell me, why day and night variate?
Ann Mm... because the Sun goes around the Earth.
Interviewer Oh I see but try to explain it in detail.
Ann The Sun goes... no... the Earth goes around the Sun I think...how was it?
Interviewer You think that the Earth turns around the Sun but try to explain 
how day and night change.
Ann The Earth goes around... no I think it was the Sun that turned around
the Earth and... I don’t remember any more/ we learnt it a long time 
ago.
It is seen that the student still tries to remember what was taught in lessons 4 years ago. 
As she could not remember, everyday knowledge (the Sun revolves) becomes dominant.
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Interestingly, only the 9th grade students hesitated when deciding which speech 
genre to use — either scientific or everyday — when responding to the interviewer 
(Michaels & Bruce, 1989; Wertsch, 1991). 5th grade students gave causal physical ex­
planations (as well as they knew them) at the beginning of the interview. Ten 9th graders 
started with everyday, personal explanations (e.g., “Day and night change because we 
must rest”, “Seasons change because it is interesting”) and only after several hints from 
the interviewer did they proceed with causal explanations4.
Summary and discussion
In the investigation, the long-term impact of teaching on children’s definitions of astron­
omy concepts (equator, axis, orbit) and explanations of phenomena (day/night variation 
and seasonal changes) was studied. Students remembered the definitions and explana­
tions quite well 2 months after studying them. They did not seek solutions from personal 
experience but referred to books’ words quite exactly. On the whole, they had acquired 
terms and theories on the level it was demanded in school. The picture had changed 
4 years after the “learning” experiment. Students had forgotten the scientific definitions, 
explanations and facts and used their everyday knowledge. Their answers were similar 
to younger children’s explanations found in other empirical studies.
The most dramatic differences were found between explanations. Our 9th graders 
gave less scientific answers than 5th graders. Half of them even started with personal 
answers but could transfer to causal (but not scientifically correct) answers (i.e., to the 
speech genre of “official science”) afterwards. But these were mainly synthetic answers 
that tried to combine everyday knowledge (the Sun moves) with causal reasoning (to 
find physical reasons for changes).
The results of our longitudinal study differ from that which has been found be­
fore by other researchers. Both Sadler (1987) and Michaels and Bruce (1989) found that 
students did not know scientific definitions and explanations even shortly after learning 
them in school. Our students had memorized the information quite exactly (5th grade). 
We also showed that they had been trained during lessons quite well. The teacher re­
peated the definitions and explanations many times, students had to answer shortly, with 
the book’s and teacher’s words.
Vosniadou and Brewer (1994) found that older students used more scientific and 
younger ones more initial and synthetic models. They have not studied the impact of 
school education on the formation of students’ models but argue only for the develop­
mental changes: “...the majority of first-grade children enter school having formed an 
initial model of the day/night cycle. During elementary school years they appear to re­
place the initial model with a synthetic model. By the end of their elementary school 
years, some children have replaced their synthetic model with scientific model” 
(pp. 170-171).
Our results may be explained by taking into account the teaching methods used in the 
school. One reason for good factual answers in the 5th grade and their later decline 
seems to be in a very traditional and teacher-centered teaching.
4 These causal explanations even if given after everyday explanations are given in Table 1 and 
were used in analyses.
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The movements of the Earth were taught in school and repeated many times during 
lessons. The teacher relied heavily on the textbook. She talked about the Sun as a center 
of the Planetary System, drew a schema on the blackboard. Students memorized the new 
information (definitions, explanations) but did not discuss it. It was not “talking science” 
but “memorizing science”. There was no need to use the information in a scientific way 
(e.g., for solving problems, discussing phenomena) (see Tulviste, 1991). No questions to 
which the answer was not written in the book (e.g., generative questions, see Vosniadou
1994) were asked in the lessons.
At the same time, the teaching did not rely on students’ everyday knowledge. The 
teacher did not discuss why we see the rising and setting Sun but talked only about the 
rotation (and revolution) of the Earth. We cannot deduce a heliocentric model only on 
the bases of our sensorial perception. A deeper explanation of unobservable phenomena 
is necessary here (see Albanese, Danhoni Neves & Vicentini, In Press). As the teaching 
did not encourage the integration of everyday and school knowledge, students forgot the 
book’s explanations and turned back to their everyday knowledge several years after 
learning.
The results also show that with factual questions it is impossible to obtain a deeper 
insight into students’ mental models and to investigate whether they had really under­
stood the phenomena. The fact is that the teachers determine the students’ understanding 
with these questions and just after teaching the topic.
The study showed that the 5th graders’ scientifically correct answers did not mean 
that they had understood the phenomena. “Good” answers were the repetitions of the 
books’ words which students could give without fully understanding them. The impact 
of teaching where the stress is on memorizing may seem great shortly after learning. But 
such teaching is not effective in the longer perspective.
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Table 1
Textbook's and students’ definitions and explanations 
Term/ Answer Type Nr of answers 
phenome-_________________________________________ __________________________________ 5th 9th
non grade
Axis Imaginary line that goes through the center of
the Earth. The Earth rotates around its axis Abstract 5 2
The line through the Earth Abstract 1 0
Imaginary around which the Earth rotates Descriptive o 6 5
Imaginary that goes through the Earth Descriptive ao
U
1 2
That which goes through the Earth Descriptive 1 2
The Earth rotates around it Descriptive 1 1
In the Earth Other 52 1 2
Tilted a little Other ü 4 0
I don't know Other 5 0 6
Orbit The way along which the Earth revolves around the Sun Abstract Õ 7 5
The path of the Earth Abstract 8© 2 2
Along which the Earth revolves around the Sun Descriptive u 2 1
Way along which the Earth rotates around its axis Other 52 6 2
The path of the Sun Other .S 0 3
I don't know Other Õ 3 7
Equator Imaginary line around the Earth that is on the same
distance from Northern and Southern Poles Abstract o 11 5
Line around the Earth Abstract § 1 2
That is around the Earth & divides it into halves Descriptive Õ 5 4
The pole of the Earth Other 1 0
The axis of the Earth Other i/iu 2 0
The center of the Earth Other Õ 0 2
I don't know Other 0 7
Day/night The Earth rotates around its axis, sometimes one side of
variation the Earth is towards the Sund, other times another side,
day is on the side of the Earth where there is the Sun Exact 13 4
The Earth rotates around its axis and around the Sun some­ A
times one side is toward the Sun, other times another side) All 1 2 4
The Earth revolves around the Sun, sometimes one side is W
toward the Sun, other times another side Mixed 3 4
The Sun revolves around the Earth, sometimes one side is
toward the Sun, other times another side Sun S3 1 7
The Sun shines in daytime and the Moon at night Descriptive (DX! 1 0
It is dark at night Descriptive Õ 0 1
Seasonal The Sun warms Southern and Northern Hemispheres
changes differently because the Earth's axis is tilted and the
Earth revolves around the Sun Exact 10 4
The Earth rotates around its axis and around the Sun, the Sun x*
lightens one side more than another All S 2 4
The eErth rotates around its axis, the Sun w
lightens one side more than another Mixed 5 3
The Sun revolves around the Earth, it moves differently in
summer and in winter Sun S2 0 7
The Sun doesn't shine so much in winter Descriptive ■I
Q
1 0
It is cold in winter Descriptive 2 2
Legend
The answers written in bold print are those given in the textbook and demanded in lessons.
Table 2
The content and structure of lessons: topics studied and activities occured









Checking Solving the 
the new problems 
material
1. Celestial bodies 100 0 27 23 23 27
2. Planetary system 100 25 0 14 30 31
3. Day & Night variation 100 20 25 15 21 19
4. Seasonal changes I 100 23 32 18 27 0
5. Seasonal changes II 100 58 0 0 0 42
6. The Moon. Outer space 100 37 0 5 18 40
7. Repeating the previous 
and introducing the new 
material
100 28 27 15 21 9
Average 100 27 16 13 20 24
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THE IMPACT OF TEACHING ON STUDENTS’ 
EXPLANATIONS OF ASTRONOMICAL PHENOMENA
Eve Kikas
Department of Psychology, University of Tartu, Estonia
The influence of school education on children’s explanations of astronomical phenom­
ena (of day/night variation and seasonal changes) was studied. First, we analyzed how 
the topic was taught in textbooks. Second, 252 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th grade students were 
questioned in a written form. Answers were categorized into “school-based” (explaining 
the phenomena by the movements of the Earth) and everyday (descriptive and “Sun- 
based”) explanations. The strong impact of teaching on students’ explanations 6 months 
after learning the topic in the 5th grade was determined. But as students only memorized 
the school knowledge, this impact did not last long. Students forgot scientific explana­
tions — 7th and 9th graders gave more everyday explanations than 5th graders. At the 
same time, new themes related with new topics learnt at school emerged in the answers.
Introduction
Children have integrated knowledge of physical phenomena which usually differs from 
scientific explanations. It has been shown that this knowledge is compromised into naive 
theories (or mental models) which are derived from children’s everyday experience 
(Carey, 1985; Neisser, 1987; Keil, 1989; Vosniadou, 1992).
Scientific explanations are learnt in school. Differently from everyday experiences, 
verbal descriptions, explanations and logical argumentation are of great importance here 
as much talk is done about out-of-empiric phenomena (Vygotsky, 1962; Tulviste, 1991). 
Some authors stress that students learn a new way of speaking at school. It is called ei­
ther talking in a language of “official science” (Wertsch, 1991), in “literate register” 
(Snow 1990) or simply “talking science” (Lemke, 1990).
Great problems with science education have been documented over decades (see an 
overview in different subjects in Glynn, Yeany & Britton, 1991; a bibliography in 
Pfundt & Duit, 1994). Actually, young children’s mental models are very difficult to 
change at school especially if they radically differ from scientific explanations and 
therefore one faces the need for inevitable knowledge restructuring (White, 1983; 
Driver, Guesne & Tiberhgien, 1985; Vosniadou, 1992; Chi, Slotta & Leeuw, 1994; Ti- 
berghien, 1994). It has been shown that children learn from school mainly the knowl­
edge that does not contradict their everyday experiences. Students also make compro­
mises, forming synthetic models (also called misconceptions) which are the attempts to 
integrate scientific and everyday information (Vosniadou, 1992). Ideally, synthetic mod­
els are replaced with scientific ones at last.
At least to some extent, the difficulties occur due to traditional teaching methods. It 
has been shown that traditional textbooks and teaching give new information (facts, 
definitions, explanations) that does not take into account students’ previous (naive) con­
ceptions (Michaels & Bruce, 1989; Renner, Abraham & Grzybowsky, 1990; Pizzini, 
Shepardson & Abell, 1992; Driscoll et a l, 1994). Also, students are only passive recipi­
ents not active knowledge builders in the traditional classrooms (Glynn, Yeany & Brit­
ton, 1991). As a result, school knowledge remains quite separate from everyday one.
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Astronomy is one of the fields where everyday models differ quite substantially from 
scientific explanation of phenomena. It has been shown by several studies that children’s 
astronomical models are consistent and difficult to change. The explanations of the rea­
sons for day/night variation and seasonal changes have also been studied time and again 
(Sadler, 1987; Michaels & Bruce, 1989; Baxter, 1989; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994).
Vosniadou and Brewer found that 38 students out of 60 (1st, 3rd and 5th graders, 6-
11 years old) had coherent day/night variation explanations and used their models con­
sistently. They found that 1st graders generally had initial models. These models were 
derived and consistent with the observations of everyday life (the Sun is occluded by 
clouds or darkness; day is replaced by night; the Sun goes out at night; the Sun goes 
behind hills). Students replaced their initial astronomical models with synthetic ones (the 
Earth goes around the Sun; the Moon blocks the Sun; the Sun moves in the space, the 
Sun and Moon move; the Earth rotates up/down; the Earth rotates and revolves) during 
elementary school years (3rd and 5th grades). Baxter (1989; 20 9-16 year-old) also 
found that younger children told more that the Sun revolved around the Earth and older 
students that the Earth spinned.
Ideally, synthetic models are replaced with scientific ones (e.g., day/night variation is 
explained with the fact that the Earth spins) at school. But it has been shown that even 
15-16 year old students have synthetic models (Baxter, 1989). Sadler (1987; 25 9th 
graders) found that the students who were completing scientific course in astronomy did 
not give more correct answers than those who were not. They only used more scientific 
terms (orbit, tilt etc.).
Michaels and Bruce (1989) analyzed how the topic of seasonal changes was taught 
in the 4th grade textbook. They found that several scientific terms were taught but the 
actual scientific explanation was so reduced and misleading that it was impossible to 
understand it. They showed that nobody (out of 20 students) learned the causal 
(scientific) explanation in lessons. They found that several students gave personal expla­
nations (the seasons change because flowers need a rest; we can skate in winter).
We replicated the study of Michaels and Bruce in Estonia (5th grade, 20 students). 
Although the topic was taught in the same way in Estonian textbook, the students’ ex­
planations 2 months after learning the topic at school were very different. Estonian stu­
dents had memorized the explanations quite well and answered to the interviewer with 
book’s words (Kikas 1992, 1994).
But the impact of learning did not last long. We interviewed the same students
4 years after learning the topic at school (9th grade) (unpublished data). It turned out 
that they had forgotten the book’s explanations: the majority of them had returned to 
synthetic and even initial explanations. As there were only 20 subjects (from one class) 
in our longitudinal study, we carried out a cross-age study with more students.
The present investigation was aimed to determine the influence of school education 
on children’s explanations of astronomical phenomena (day/night variation and seasonal 
changes). We could show the strong impact of teaching on students’ explanations shortly 
after learning the topics at school. But as students only memorized the school knowledge 





Our investigation was conducted in 4 usual Estonian secondary schools in Tartu (the 
second largest town in Estonia, population approximately 120 000, 16 schools). At all 
the schools science was taught according to the same program. The subjects for the 
study were 252 schoolchildren: 46 third graders (age 9-10, 30 girls, 16 boys); 75 fifth 
graders, (age 11-12, 31 girls, 44 boys); 52 seventh graders (age 13-14, 32 girls, 
20 boys) 79 ninth graders (age 15-17, 44 girls, 35 boys).
Procedure
1. Preliminary analyses of textbooks. A special attention was paid to the ways day/night 
variation and seasonal changes were explained in textbooks.
2. Testing children. The children were tested in a written form with the whole class. 
The following questions were asked:
• Why do night and day change?
• Why do seasons change?
The answers to the questions were analyzed.
Results 
Textbook discourse
The themes “Day and night variation” and “Seasonal changes” are studied for the first 
time in the 5th grade in science lessons. Estonian schools have a science textbook 
(Nilson & Tiits, 1988) and a workbook (Nilson & Tiits, 1989). Text contains of five 
interrelated subtopics and a summary:
1. Celestial Bodies (2 pages of text with 1 figure and 12 questions; 7 new terms with 
definitions in the textbook, 4 exercises in the workbook).
2. Planetary System (3 pages, 2 figures, 8 questions, 4 new terms, 3 exercises).
3. Day and Night Variation (3.5 pages, 3 figures, 8 questions, 2 new terms, 6 exer­
cises).
4. Seasonal Changes (3.5 pages, 3 figures, 7 questions, 2 new terms, 7 exercises).
5. The Moon. Exploration of the Outer Space (3 pages, 1 figure, 9 questions, 4 new 
terms, 5 exercises).
6. Summary (1.5 pages, 24 questions on the whole topic).
The emphasis is on definitions of terms and long descriptions of phenomena. The 
parts that are stressed are printed in bold and separately. The following explanations of 
day/night and seasonal changes are printed in bold:
“D ay an d  n igh t change becau se the E arth  ro ta tes around i t ’s axis, som etim es one 
side o f  the E arth  is tow ards the Sun, an oth er tim es an other side, day  is on this side  
o f  the E arth  w here there is the Sun”;
“Seasons change because the Sun w arm s Southern and N orthern H em ispheres d if­
fe ren tly  becau se the E a r th ’s  axis is tilted  an d  the E arth revo lves arou nd the Sun”.
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The book’s explanations take into account neither children’s naive theories nor stress 
the critical knowledge necessary for understanding scientific explanations. The answers 
to the questions in workbook can be found from directly from the text.
Seasonal changes are implicitly treated in the 7th grade during learning the topic 
“Climate” (subtopics “The Factors that Influence Climate” and “Climate Zones”). There 
is no general explanation of why seasons change in the textbook (Jõgi et al., 1992). But 
there are long descriptions of different climate zones (equatorial, temperate zone etc.), 
their geographical position and differences in temperature.
Children’s knowledge
Proceeding from the empirical data, we divided the explanations of the reasons for 
day/night variation and seasonal changes into four (sub)categories which were grouped 
into two major categories.
1. “School-based” answers give physical reasons (connected with the movements of 
the Earth) that are learnt at school. Here, “exact” answers contain more or less “exact” 
textbook explanation (see before). In “Mixed” answers student tells either all s/he re­
members (explaining reasons for either day/night variation or seasonal changes by the 
fact that the Earth revolves around the axis and around the Sun) or mixes up reasons for 
day/night and seasonal changes.
2. “Everyday” answers. Here, “Sun” answers give the reason for changes in the Sun 
rotating around the Earth. It is also a causal explanation but actually wrong: it is taught 
at school that not the Sun but the Earth revolves around1. “Descriptive” answers do not 
give any causal (physical) reason for the change but either describe what can be seen or 
felt or give personal explanations.
As compared to Vosniadou’s and Brewer’s classification schema (1994), “exact” ex­
planations can be identified to scientific, “mixed” and “Sun” answers to synthetic and 
descriptive answers to initial explanations. As our interest was mainly on the impact of 
teaching on explanations we preferred to use the categories “school-based” and 
“everyday” (and corresponding subcategories “exact”, “mixed”, “Sun” and 
“descriptive”).
Quantitative Changes
The number and percentage of students’ answers in each subcategory and category in 
different grades are shown in Table 1 (for day/night variation) and in Table 2 (for sea­
sonal changes).
1 At least it is wrong in school context. According both to Galilean and Einsteinian relativity the­
ory, it is all the same either to tell that the Earth revolves around the Sun or the Sun revolves 
around the Earth. But there is a difference between the easiness and convenience in describing 
these revolutions. For sure, the Sun’s revolution alone does not cause day/night variation.
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Table 1
The distribution of explanations of day/night variation in different grades 
(in numbers and percentage)
Grade Number and % of answers
Descriptive Sun Others Mixed Exact School-based
Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % Nr. %
3rd 30 65 5 11 35 76 5 11 6 13 11 24
5th 15 20 1 1 16 21 20 27 39 52 59 79
*yth 18 35 4 8 22 43 11 21 19 37 30 58
glh 19 24 11 14 30 38 19 24 30 38 49 62
Table 2
The distribution of explanations of seasonal changes in different grades 
(in numbers and percentage)
Grade Number and % of answers
Descriptive Sun Others Mixed Exact School-based
Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % Nr. %
3rd 42 91 1 2 43 93 2 4 1 2 3 6
5th 18 24 1 1 19 25 12 16 44 59 36 75
yth 21 40 4 8 25 48 11 21 16 31 27 52
9th 17 22 11 14 28 36 14 18 37 47 51 65
It is seen from the tables that 3rd graders gave mainly descriptive answers (65% of an­
swers for day/night variation and 91% for seasonal changes). Still, some students ex­
plained phenomena with the movements of the Earth (gave “school-based” answers).
The majority of 5th graders’ answers were “school-based”. Even more, they were 
mainly “exact” (52% for day/night variation and 59% for seasonal changes). The differ­
ence between “school-based” answers in the 3rd and 5th grades was statistically highly 
significant; %2(1)=35.06, p=0.0000 (for day/night variation) and %2(1)=52.99, p=0.0000 
(for seasonal changes).
There were less “school-based” answers in the 7th (58% and 52%) and 9th (62% and 
65%) grades than in the 5th grade. The difference was statistically significant between 
the 5th and the 7th grades for both explanations (%2(1)= 6.44, p=0.01 for day/night 
variation; x2(l)=7.01, p=0.008 for seasonal changes) and for explanation of day/night 
variation between the 5th and 9th grades (%2(1)=5.08, p=0.024) but nonsignificant for 
seasonal changes (%2(1)=1.85, p=0.173).
There was a high consistency in explanations of day/night and seasonal changes in 
all grades; Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient R=0.806, p=0.000. So, students tend 
to explain both phenomena relatedly, in the same manner (compare Vosniadou & 
Brewer, 1994).
Except in the 5th grade, boys gave more “school-based” answers than the girls. The 
difference was extremely high and statistically significant in the 9th grade, x2(l)=24.27; 
p=0.0000 (for seasonal changes) and %2(1)=18.8; p=0.000 (for day/night variation). 9th
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grade boys gave mainly “school-based” answers (89% for day/night variation and 94% 
for seasonal changes). Only 41% of girls gave “school-based” answers (for both phe­
nomena), all the “Sun”-explanations were also given by girls. There were no statistically 
significant differences between the boys’ and girls’ marks in mathematics, science and 
language.
The Content of the Answers
The majority of 3rd grade answers were either personal explanations (e.g., “Day and 
night change because we need to rest”) or descriptions of different seasons and day/night 
(e.g., “The Sun shines at daytime and the Moon and stars at night”).
The majority of 5th grade explanations were like those written in the textbook. Ex­
planations were quite similar to each other, more or less in book’s words. Children’s 
answers differed in how well they had remembered the differences between the Earth’s 
rotation around it’s axis and around the Sun: some children mixed up the explanations 
for day/night and the seasonal changes, some couldn’t distinguish between “exact” rea­
sons of changes and, therefore, told everything they remembered.
There was more variety in 7th and 9th graders’ answers. The 5th grade science text­
book was not the main source of the knowledge any more. 14% of students wrote that 
the Sun revolved around the Earth. Descriptions were longer and of different aspects of 
changes, some of them were very poetic. For example: “A morning starts with sunrise. 
The higher the Sun the more beautiful becomes the day. A night starts with sunset which 
is very nice to look at. The Moon comes out. There are different types of Moons.”
The impact of teaching was seen in new themes driven from lately studied topics. 
31% of 7th graders (5% of 9th graders) referred to our geographical position, climate 
zones, equator while explaining the reasons of seasonal changes. For example: “Seasons 
change because we do not live near equator”; “Seasons change because we live in a 
temperate zone which is not very close to the Sun”. These were themes that had been 
studied in the 7th grade (4 months before questioning students).
Summary and discussion
In our cross-age investigation the impact of learning on children’s explanations of 
day/night variation and seasonal changes was studied. We showed that students memo­
rized the knowledge taught in lessons quite exactly but did not integrate it into their eve­
ryday knowledge and forgot it soon. At the same time, new themes, learned in older 
grades, emerged in the answers.
3rd grade students had mainly naive “everyday” explanations for both phenomena. 
Students gave “school-based” explanations in the 5th grade, 6 months after learning the 
topic at school. They used book’s words quite exactly. But as the students did not inte­
grate their everyday and school knowledge, they forgot the latter soon and drop down to 
previous explanations. Many 7th and 9th grade students had forgotten book’s explana­
tions and had to use their everyday knowledge. Their answers were more “childish” than 
in the 5th grade. The impact of teaching was seen in new themes emerged from the re­
cently studied topics (climate zones, geographical position in 7th grade).
The finding that boys gave more “school-based” answers than girls needs further 
clarification especially in the context that boys were not better students at school.
The results of our study differ from what has been found before. Both Sadler (1987) 
and Michaels and Bruce (1989) found that students had not acquired scientific explana­
6
tions even shortly after learning them at school. Our students had memorized the infor­
mation quite exactly (5th grade).
Vosniadou and Brewer (1994) found that older students had more scientific, younger 
ones more initial and synthetic models. Our 7th and 9th graders gave less “exact” an­
swers than 5th graders. There were more synthetic answers that tried to combine every­
day knowledge (the Sun moves) with causal reasoning (to find physical reasons for 
changes). These results can be explained only by taking into account the impact of 
teaching at school on the formation of children’s explanations.
One reason for good answers in the 5th grade and the later decline seems to be in a 
very traditional and teacher-centered teaching. We have shown before (Kikas, 1994) that 
students were trained during lessons quite much. Students memorized the new informa­
tion but did not discuss about it. There was no need to use the information in a scientific 
way (e.g., for solving problems, compare Tulviste, 1991). It seems that the impact of 
teaching where the stress is on memorizing, may be great shortly after learning but not in 
the longer perspective.
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STUDENTS’ UNDERSTANDING OF ASTRONOMICAL 
PHENOMENA: DEVELOPMENT 
OF VERBAL EXPLANATIONS AND DRAWINGS
Eve Kikas 
University of Tartu, Estonia
A study of the development of children’s ability to explain and illustrate astronomical 
phenomena (day/night variations and seasonal changes), and the influences of education 
on it, was carried out. An initial analysis was conducted of the way the topics were cov­
ered in the textbooks. Subsequently, 252 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th grade students were ques­
tioned in a written form in order to establish their ability to explain and illustrate the 
phenomena. Explanations and drawings were analyzed both separately and in relation to 
one another. The results indicated different impact of teaching on students’ explanations 
and illustrations. 6 months after learning the topic in the 5th grade, students gave mainly 
exact textbook’s explanations but aggregate illustrations. As their verbal acquisition of 
knowledge was quite illusory, students returned to everyday — aggregate and descrip­
tive — explanations in older grades. Our results show that the teaching method where 
stress is on memorizing gives outwardly good results shortly after learning. But as the 
integration of everyday and school knowledge is not encouraged, a tendency to turn 
back to everyday explanations may be followed. The results raise also the question of 
assessing students’ understanding of knowledge in general.
Introduction
The investigation was aimed to study the development of children’s ability to explain 
and illustrate astronomical phenomena (day/night variations and seasonal changes) and 
the influences of education on the development. Proceeding from Sociocultural ap­
proach, textbook discourse, children’s explanations, and drawings were studied and 
analyzed.
Development of concepts
Children’s everyday experience provides a lot of information to develop their under­
standing of the world. Besides child’s own observation, development of concepts is also 
influenced by culture, society and parents. While Piaget (1926, 1932) finds the child’s 
own exploration of the world the main reason for conceptual development, then Vygot­
sky (1994a) stresses the sociocultural origin of development instead.
Vygotsky (1994b, 1994c) distinguishes between scientific and everyday (or sponta­
neous) concepts. Everyday concepts are mastered by being in direct contact with their 
references (the objects to which the word for the concept refers) or observing the corre­
sponding phenomena. These concepts develop from concrete instances to general ab­
stractions. Child’s internal activity is important for the development of everyday con­
cepts. Vygotsky assumed that everyday concepts do not fall into system.
Vygotsky associates the impact of school education on the child’s thinking processes 
with the development of new kind of concepts, namely, scientific ones. It is important to
stress that he does not regard scientific concepts simply as those related to natural or 
exact sciences but rather identifies them with the ones learnt in school. It is characteris­
tic to scientific concepts that 1) they belong to a special conceptual system; 2) they enter 
into “supraempirical”, experience-external connections, and 3) the thinker reflects on 
them (Kikas, 1991). Vygotsky stresses that although scientific concepts are learnt ver­
bally, they are not acquired in ready-made form. At the same time, they develop differ­
ently from everyday concepts.
The latter peculiarities of scientific concepts come from the characteristics of school 
education. Knowledge taught in school (e.g., in science lessons) is based on a contempo­
rary scientific view. Although derived from observational data, scientific explanations 
are theory-based, enabling (even demanding) experience-external connections inbetween 
concepts (Kuhn, 1962; Tulviste, 1991; Carey & Smith, 1993; Albanese et al., in press). 
Talking about nowadays scientific explanations frequently means a talk about unseen 
phenomena and relations. Therefore, verbal descriptions, explanations, and logical in­
ferences are of great importance in this learning process (Vygotsky, 1994c; Tulviste, 
1991). Frequently, illustrations (models, schemes) are used to facilitate the understand­
ing of phenomena, and concretize verbal explanations. Illustrative tools are not a direct 
diminished copy of the reality but the ones for symbolizing the phenomena and commu­
nicating implicit information as well (i.e., mediational means or signs, see Vygotsky, 
1982). Vygotsky (1994c) talks about the developmental advantage of scientific concepts 
compared with everyday ones, just because they belong to a special system, and because 
they are co-constructed by a student, together with a teacher.
The difficulty of child’s use of scientific concepts is in their abstractness and de­
tachment from reality. In the course of teaching and learning, scientific concepts influ­
ence and interact with everyday ones and, therefore, should be filled with concrete expe­
rience. Vygotsky writes that the development of concepts is a time-consuming and com­
plicated thinking process presupposing the development of several intellectual functions 
(e.g., deliberate attention, abstraction). When a child hears a new word (e.g., in the form 
of definition), the development is starting not ending. Vygotsky warns against verbal­
isms in teaching when children do not acquire concepts but words, relying mainly on 
their memory and not on thinking, therefore not being able to use their knowledge.
Recent studies have shown that children’s everyday concepts are embedded in larger 
theoretical structures. These are called naive theories (or mental models) and they are 
different from nowadays scientific theories (Carey, 1985; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Neis­
ser, 1987; Keil, 1989; Vosniadou, 1992). But it has also been shown that although chil­
dren’s knowledge is to some extent integrated they are not able to reflect on it. In fact, it 
appears that young children’s everyday models are very difficult to change by teaching 
especially if they essentially differ from scientific explanations, and therefore, radical 
knowledge restructuring is inevitable (White, 1983; Driver, Guesne & Tiberghien, 1985; 
Neisser, 1987; Vosniadou, 1992; Chi, Slotta & Leeuw, 1994; Vosniadou & Brewer, 
1994; Glynn & Duit, 1995). Students learn from school the knowledge that does not 
contradict their everyday experiences. They also form synthetic models (also called mis­
conceptions) which are compromises between everyday beliefs and school knowledge 
(Vosniadou, 1992). Sometimes they acquire scientific concepts mainly verbally (mere 
verbalisms according to Vygotsky), their later integration with everyday models not 
taking place (school and everyday concepts remain separate).
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Children’s naive theories of astronomy and education
Children get information about astronomical phenomena by observation: they see that 
the Earth is flat, the Sun rises in the morning and sets in the evening (i.e., the Sun is 
moving in the sky), that the Sun is lower in the sky in winter and higher in summer. 
Children construct their understanding actively from what they see (everyday concepts). 
Even more, the everyday expressions commonly used give the countenance to the acqui­
sition of these concepts: it is said that the Sun rises and even (at least in Estonia) that it 
goes to sleep at night.
It is not possible to derive nowadays heliocentric astronomical model basing only on 
everyday perceptual information. In fact theories in astronomy as a scientific discipline 
have undergone a radical restructuring in the course of the historical development. It has 
been shown that there is a noticeable similarity between children’s mental models of 
astronomy and the explanations found in history: young children’s mental models are 
similar to theories used in ancient and medieval times (Vosniadou, 1992; Albanese et 
al., in press).
Nowadays heliocentric theory (the Sun as the center of Planetary System, the Earth 
rotating and revolving) (scientific concept) is taught in school by verbal explanations 
(given in textbooks and by teachers). As with other difficult phenomena which we can­
not observe directly (we neither see nor feel the Earth’s movements), models and 
schemes are used to clarify the explanations.
It has been shown by several studies that children’s naive astronomical models are 
consistent and difficult to change (Sadler, 1987; Michaels & Bruce, 1989; Baxter, 1989; 
1995; Vosniadou, 1992; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994; Ar­
nold, Sarge & Worrall, 1995 ).
Vosniadou and Brewer found that 1st graders’ (initial) models were derived from the 
observations (“the Sun is occluded by clouds or darkness”; “day is replaced by night”; 
“the Sun goes out at night”; “the Sun goes behind hills”). Students replaced their initial 
astronomical models by synthetic ones (“the Earth goes around the Sun”; “the Moon 
blocks the Sun”; “the Sun moves in the space”, “the Sun and Moon move”; “the Earth 
rotates up/down”; “the Earth rotates and revolves”) during elementary school years (3rd 
and 5th grades). Ideally, synthetic models are replaced by scientific ones (i.e., day/night 
variation is explained by the fact that the Earth spins) in school. But it has been shown 
that even 15-16 year old students have synthetic models (Baxter, 1989). Sadler (1987) 
found that 9th grade students who were completing scientific course in astronomy did not 
give more correct answers than those who were not. They only used more scientific 
terms (e.g., orbit, tilt), i.e., had acquired words, not their exact meaning.
Michaels and Bruce (1989) showed that nobody out of 20 4th graders learned the 
causal (scientific) explanation of seasonal changes in lessons. The majority of students 
still had a “distance theory” (“it is colder in winter because the Sun is further from the 
Earth”) but several students gave personal explanations (“the seasons change because 
flowers need a rest”; “we can skate in winter”) as well. They also analyzed how the topic 
of seasonal changes was taught in the textbook and found that several scientific terms 
were taught but the actual scientific explanation was so reduced and misleading that it 
was impossible to understand it.
We have shown in a longitudinal study with 20 students (unpublished data) that stu­
dents remembered the explanations of seasonal and day/night changes 2 months after
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learning the topic in school (5th grade) very well. Their explanations were quite similar 
to textbook’s ones. But the picture had changed 4 years later (9th grade, the same stu­
dents). Students had forgotten the book’s explanation and the majority of them had re­
turned to synthetic (“the Sun revolves around the Earth”) and even personal (“we have 
night because we must rest”) explanations.
Besides questions, illustrations have also been used to study students’ astronomical 
models (e.g., Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992, 1994; Arnold, Sarge & Worrall, 1995; Baxter,
1995). Drawings are specially helpful to understand synthetic models which actually are 
the compromises between initial (what is seen) and scientific (what is talked about in 
school) concepts.
At least to some extent, the difficulties in conceptual development occur due to tra­
ditional teaching methods. It has been shown that traditional textbooks and teaching give 
new information (facts, definitions, explanations) that does not take into account stu­
dents’ previous (naive) conceptions (Michaels & Bruce, 1989; Renner, Abraham & 
Grzybowsky, 1990; Pizzini, Shepardson & Abell, 1992; Driscoll, Moallem, Dick & 
Kirby, 1994; Stinner, 1995). This new knowledge remains quite far and abstract for a 
child. In addition, textbooks’ illustrations are sometimes quite misleading. Michaels and 
Bruce (1989) showed that the scheme illustrating seasonal changes gave countenance for 
“distance theory” as the orbit of the Earth was drawn as an ellipse. Students’ ease or 
difficulty in using models and schemes is influenced by their knowledge of what models 
are intended to communicate. It has been shown that most of the middle school students 
think models to be little copies of real-world objects (Grosslight, Unger, Jay, & Smith,
1991). If students do not understand what models are intended to be represented, they 
apparently fail to comprehend the representational systems behind them.
Also, students are only passive recipients not active knowledge builders in the tradi­
tional classrooms where the instructional mode of lecture, question and answer is widely 
used. Teachers deliver facts and explanations and the students’ task is to memorize them 
in order to know the answer to the evaluative questions (Glynn & Duit, 1995; Glynn, 
Yeany & Britton, 1991). Vygotsky was against these methods: “Direct teaching of con­
cepts is impossible and fruitless. A teacher who tries to do this usually accomplishes 
nothing but empty verbalism, a parrotlike repetition of words by a child, simulating a 




Our investigation was conducted in 4 Estonian secondary schools of Tartu (the second 
largest town in Estonia, population approximately 120 000, 16 schools). In all four 
schools science was taught according to the same program (the textbooks were the same 
as well). The subjects for the study were 252 schoolchildren: 46 third graders (age 9-10, 
30 girls, 16 boys); 75 fifth graders, (age 11-12, 31 girls, 44 boys); 52 seventh graders 
(age 13-14, 32 girls, 20 boys); 79 ninth graders (age 15-17, 44 girls, 35 boys).
4
Procedure
1. Analyzing textbook discourse. We looked through all the textbooks that are used in 
Estonian schools in science lessons till 9th grade. The same textbooks have been used in 
the schools for decades. It means that all 5th, 7th, and 9th graders have used the same 
book in learning the topics. We studied the text and illustrations explaining day/night 
variation and seasonal changes.
2. Testing children. The children were tested in a written form with the whole class 
being present. The following questions were asked:
• Why do night and day change? Illustrate your answer.
• Why do seasons change? Illustrate your answer.
3. Categorizing answers. The answers to the questions and their illustrations were 
analyzed both separately and in relation to each other. Proceeding from the empirical 
data, explanations and illustrations were divided into three categories. Examples of an­
swers in each category are given in Table 1 and Figures 1-2.






1. Day and night change because the Earth rotates around its axis, sometimes one 
side of the Earth is toward the Sun, other times another side, day is on this side 
where there is the Sun.
1. Day and night change because the Earth revolves around the Sun, sometimes ... 
(the same as before)
2. Day and night change because the Earth rotates around its axis and around the 
Sun, sometimes...
3. Day and night change because the Sun revolves around the Earth, som etim es...
1. Day and night change because we need to rest at night.
2. Day and night change because the Sun shines in daytime and the Moon at night.
3. A morning begins with sunrise. The higher the Sun the more beautiful becomes a 
day. A night begins with sunset which is very beautiful to look at. The Moon 
comes out. There are different types of moons.
Seasonal changes
1. Seasons change because the Earth revolves around the Sun and the Sun warms 
the Southern and Northern parts of the Earth differently.
1. Seasons change because the Earth rotates around its axis.
2. Seasons change because the Sun revolves around the Earth.
1. Seasons change because it is cold in winter and warm in summer.
2. Seasons change because it is interesting to ski in winter and swim in summer
3. Seasons change because we live far away from the equator.
4. The Sun is hot in summer. It rains a lot in autumn and the Sun is very cold in 
winter. It is a little bit warmer in spring.






I Exact answers contain more or less exact textbook explanation. Students explain the 
phenomena correctly by the movements of the Earth. The illustrations are also similar to 
those in the textbook (Figures la, 2a-b). The orbit of the Earth could be either ellipse an 
or a circle (Figures 2a-b).
II Aggregate (intermediate) answers contain either non-exact school knowledge or eve­
ryday and school knowledge is connected in a peculiar way. Several subcategories of 
such answers were found. In mixed answers student either relates all s/he remembers 
(explaining reasons for either day/night variation or seasonal changes by the fact that the 
Earth revolves around the axis and around the Sun) or confuses the reasons for day/night 
and seasonal changes (i.e., gives the wrong movements of the Earth). The same move­
ments are shown on illustrations (Figure lb, Figure 2c). The Sun-movements answers 
give the reason for changes in the Sun rotating around the Earth (cf. synthetic models by 
Vosniadou, 1992.) . It is also a causal explanation but actually wrong: it is taught in 
school that not the Sun but the Earth revolves around. In illustrations, the revolving Sun 
is drawn (Figure lc). Strange illustrations give a scheme (usually with both the Earth 
and the Sun on it) which is not physically correct (Figure Id, Figures 2d-f).
Figure 1











III Descriptive answers do not give any causal (physical) reason for the change but ei­
ther describe what can be seen or felt or give personal explanations (cf. initial models by 
Vosniadou, 1992). Corresponding illustrations are simple drawings of summer (with 
flowers and green trees), winter (with snow, snowmen, skiing), day (people working) 
and night (people sleeping).
Missing (no drawing). All the children gave explanations but several did not illus­
trate their answers.





The themes “Day and night variation” and “Seasonal changes” are studied for the first 
time in the 5th grade in science lessons. Estonian schools have a science textbook 
(Nilson & Tiits, 1988) and a workbook (Nilson & Tiits, 1989) (for more detailed analy­
sis of these texts see Kikas, In press). The emphasis is on definitions of terms and long 
descriptions of phenomena. The parts that are stressed are printed in bold and presented 
separately. The following explanations of day/night and seasonal changes are given: “ 
Day and night change because the Earth rotates around it’s axis, sometimes one 
side of the Earth is towards the Sun, another times another side, day is on this side 
of the Earth where there is the Sun”, “Seasons change because the Sun warms 
Southern and Northern Hemispheres differently because the Earth’s axis is tilted 
and the Earth revolves around the Sun”. Both the phenomena are illustrated. These 
illustrations are given in Figure 3. The answers to the questions in workbook can be 
found directly from the text.
The book’s explanations take into account neither children’s naive theories nor stress 
the critical knowledge necessary for understanding scientific explanations. Even more, 
the illustration (Figure 3b; the Earth’s orbit is drawn as an ellipse) gives countenance to 
the widespread explanation of seasonal changes that the distance from the Sun accounts 
for the temperature change (the Earth is closer to the Sun in summer and farther away in 
winter) (cf. Michaels & Bruce, 1989). Although the Earth’s orbit is more or less a circle, 
it is usually shown inclined which enables to show the angle of the Earth’s axis toward 
the Sun. Just the changing of this angle (that causes the changes in light’s angle toward a 
concrete place on the Earth) causes seasonal changes. If the scheme is not explained by 
the teacher, it is very difficult to understand its meaning.
The topic is not taught explicitly in older grades any more. Seasonal changes are im­
plicitly treated in the 7th grade during learning the topic “Climate” (subtopics “The Fac­
tors that Influence Climate” and “Climate Zones”). There is no general explanation of 
why seasons change in the textbook (Jõgi, Kokovik, Kull, Milder & Silam, 1992). But 
there are long descriptions of different climate zones (equatorial, temperate zone etc.), 
their geographical position and differences in temperature.
Figure 3
Illustrations in the 5th grade textbook
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Analysis of children’s explanations and illustrations
The distributions of explanations and illustrations (number and percentage of students’ 
answers in each category) in different grades is shown in Table 2 (day/night variation) 
and Table 3 (seasonal changes). Here, the distribution of explanations is shown in col­
umns and distribution of illustrations in rows.
Table 2
The distribution of the explanations and illustrations of 










All Desc- Aggregate Exact 
riptive
All
Descriptive 30(66) 3 (7 ) 5(11) 38(84) 6 (8 ) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 6(8)
Aggregate 0 (0 ) 7(15) 0 (0 ) 7(15) 5 (7 ) 15(20) 1 3(17) 33(44)
Exact 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 1(1) 1(1) 0 (0 ) K D  1 8(24) 19(25)
Missing 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 0(0) 4 (5 ) 5 (7 ) 8(11) 17(23)
All 30(66) 10(22) 6(12) 46(100) 15(20) 21(28) 39(52) 75(100)
T ab le  2 (con tinued)
Grade 7th 9th
Category of
explanation/ Desc­ Aggregate Exact All Desc­ Aggregate Exact All
illustration riptive riptive
Descriptive 4 (8 ) 3 (6 ) 0 (0 ) 7(14) 6 (7 ) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 6(7)
Aggregate 10(19) 7(13) 5(10) 22(42) 2(3 ) 18(23) 2 (3 ) 22(29)
Exact 1(2) 1 (2) 14(27) 16(31) 0 (0 ) K D 20(25) 21(26)
Missing 3 (6 ) 4 (7 ) 0 (0 ) 7(13) 11(14) 11(14) 8(10) 30(38)
All 18(35) 15(28) 19(37) 52(100) 19(24) 30(38) 30(38) 79(100)
It is seen from the Tables that 3rd graders (who have not learnt the topic in school) gave 
mainly descriptive explanations and illustrations. Students gave either personal explana­
tions (e.g., “day and night change because we need to rest”) or descriptions of different 
seasons, day, and night (e.g., “the Sun shines at daytime and the Moon and stars at 
night”). Only some students explained phenomena with the movements of the Earth, 
only one draw an exact scheme illustrating day/night variation. From the 5th grade on, 
there were less descriptive explanations and drawings given. At the same time, several 
students did not illustrate their answers at all.
The results show that school teaching has great but different impact on students’ ex­
planations and illustrations beginning from the 5th grade.
Explanations. The majority of 5th graders’ explanations were exact (see Figure 4). 
The difference between “exact “ explanations in the 3rd and 5th grades was statistically
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highly significant; %2(1)=18.52, p=0.0000 (for day/night variation) and %2(1)=38.96, 
p=0.0000 (for seasonal changes). There were less exact answers in the 7th and 9th grades 
than in the 5th grade. The difference was statistically significant between the 5th and the 
7th grades for explanations for seasonal changes (%2(1)=9.59, p=0.002); other changes 
were not statistically significant (%2(1)=2.96, p=0.085 for day/night variation between 
the 5th and 7th grade and %2(1)=3.06, p=0.08 for day/night variation; %2( 1 )=2.16, p=0.14 
for seasonal changes between the 5th and 9th grades).
Table 3
The distribution of the explanations and illustrations 
of seasonal changes in different grades in numbers and percentage
Grade 3rd 5th
Category of
explanation/ Desc­ Aggregate Exact All Desc­ Aggregate Exact All
illustration riptive riptive
Descriptive 42(92) 3 (7 ) K D 46(100) 11(15) 0 (0 ) K D 12(16)
Aggregate 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 3 (4 ) 10(13) 21(28) 34(45)
Exact 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 15(21) 15(21)
Missing 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 4 (5 ) 3 (4 ) 7 (9 ) 14(18)
All 42(92) 3 (7 ) K D 46(100) 18(24) 13(17) 44(59) 75(100)
T ab le  3 (con tinued)
Grade 7th 9th
Category of
explanation/ Desc­ Aggregate Exact All Desc­ Aggregate Exact All
illustration riptive riptive
Descriptive 7(13) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 ) 7(13) 7 (9 ) 1(1) 0 (0 ) 8(10)
Aggregate 3 (6 ) 7(13) 4 (8 ) 14(27) 2 (2 ) 12(15) 6 (8 ) 20(25)
Exact 0 (0 ) 4 (8 ) 12(23) 16(31) 0 (0 ) 0 (0) 23(29) 23(29)
Missing 11(21) 4 (8 ) 0 (0 ) 15(29) 8(10) 12(15) 8(11) 28(36)
All 21(40) 15(29) 16(31) 52(100) 17(21) 25(31) 37(48) 79(100)
Illustrations. Only a quarter of 5th grade students showed exact movements of the Earth 
on their drawings (see Tables 2-3), but illustrations of 44% of 5th graders were aggre­
gate, combining information learnt in school and seen by one’s own eyes. There were 
less aggregate illustrations in the 7th and 9th grades but the percentage of exact illustra­
tions did not grow.
Consistency in answers. First, there was a high consistency both in explanations 
and illustrations (i.e., using the same category answer for day/night and seasonal 
changes) in all grades; Kendall’ s 1=0.67, p=0.000 (for explanations) and x=0.53, 
p=0.000 (for illustrations). So, students tend to explain and illustrate both phenomena 
relatedly, in the same manner (cf. Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994). Second, there was a con­
sistency in explanations and illustrations (i.e., using the same category answer for ex­
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p lain ing  and d raw ing) in all grades, K en d a ll’ s x= 0 .71, p= 0 .000  (for day /n igh t varia­
tion) and x = 0 .773 , p= 0 .000  (for seasonal changes).
F igure 4









□  day /n igh t varia tion I seasonal changes
Qualitative changes in explanations. Strong  im pact o f  teach ing  on stu d en ts’ exp lana­
tions w as seen in the 5 th grade. 5 th graders exp lana tions w ere quite sim ilar to each other, 
expressed  in b o o k ’s w ords m ostly .
B u t the  im pact o f  teach ing  on exp lana tions d id  not last long. T here  was m ore variety  
in 7 th and 9 th g rad e rs’ answ ers than in 5 th g raders ones. T he 5 th g rade science tex tbook  
was no t the m ain  source o f  the  know ledge any m ore. D escrip tions w ere longer and o f  
d ifferen t aspects o f  changes, som e o f  them  being  rem arkably  poetic (see the 5 th and 1 1th 
answ ers in T ab le  1). T he im pact o f  teach ing  w as seen in new  them es driven  from  lately  
stud ied  top ics. 31%  o f  7 th graders (5%  o f  9 th graders) referred  to our geographical posi­
tion , c lim ate  zones, and the equa to r w hile explain ing  the reasons fo r seasonal changes 
(see the 9 th answ er in T ab le  1). T he la tter w ere the concepts tha t had been studied  in the 
7 th g rade (4 m onths befo re  the question ing  o f  the students). O lder students used m ore 
scien tific  te rm s in the ir answ ers (cf. Sadler, 1987).
Differences in explaining and illustrating phenomena. A fter learning a topic in 
school (5 th g rade), students gave exp lana tions that based on the tex tbook  (see T ab le  1, 
exact exp lana tions). T hey  had m em orized  the tex tb o o k ’s know ledge quite exactly . A t 
the sam e tim e, the students illu strated  the ir answ ers quite d ifferently . It is seen from  T a ­
bles 2 -3  tha t p a rt o f  5 th g raders w hose exp lana tions are exact illustrate the ir answ ers 
co rrespond ing ly  (i.e., w ith exac t draw ings). O thers e ither do not illustrate their answ ers 
a t all or do  it w ith aggregate  draw ings. A lso , students w ho have not d ifferen tia ted  b e ­
tw een exac t reasons fo r changes (aggregate  exp lanations) tend to draw  aggregate  illus­
trations. It is a lso  seen from  T ab les 2 -3  tha t in all grades, usually, if  a studen t gives an 
exac t illu strations, s/he also g ives an exact explanation .
W e analyzed  separately  the d is tribu tions o f  d ifferen t categories o f  illustrations w hich 
accom pan ied  exac t exp lana tions in g rades 5 -9  (see T ab les 2 -3  co lum ns exac t and F ig ­
ure 5). T he percen tage  o f  exact illustrations increases and o f  aggregate  illustrations d e ­
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creases in o lder grades. T he d ifference  betw een  the percen tages o f  exact illustrations is 
sta tistically  a bo rderline  fo r day /n igh t variation  (p= .027  betw een 5 th and 7 th grades; 
p= .047  betw een 5 th and 9 th g rades) and sign ifican t fo r seasonal changes (p= .003  betw een 
5 th and 7 th g rades; p= .007  betw een  5 th and 9 th grades). T he d ifference  betw een  the per­
cen tage o f  aggregate  illu stra tions is sta tistically  nonsign ifican t betw een 5 th and 7 th grades 
(p= .295 fo r day /n igh t varia tion  and p= .06  fo r seasonal changes) bu t sign ifican t betw een 
5 th and 9 th g rades (p= .002  fo r bo th  phenom ena).
F igure  5
Distribution of illustrations accompained with exact explanations
(a) day /n igh t variation (b) seasonal changes
Discussion
In the p resen t investigation , the deve lopm en t o f  ch ild ren ’s ability  to explain  and illu s­
trate day /n igh t varia tion  and seasonal changes and the im pact o f  education  on this d e ­
velopm ent w as stud ied . W e show ed the strong  bu t d ifferen t influence o f  teach ing  on 
s tu d en ts’ verbal exp lana tions and draw ings. O ur results also raised  the question  o f  as­
sessing  s tu d en ts’ understand ing  o f  know ledge in general.
T hird  g raders w ho had no t studied  the top ic  in school gave m ainly everyday  ex p la ­
nations and illu stra ted  their answ ers accord ing ly . T he strong im pact o f  teach ing  on  stu ­
d en ts’ exp lana tions w as determ ined  6 m onths after learning the top ic  in school: the m a­
jo rity  o f  5 th g rad e rs’ exp lana tions w ere the sam e as in the tex tbook , i.e., studen ts w ere 
able to rep roduce  tex tbook  exp lana tions (see F igure 4). T here w ere less exac t and m ore 
aggregate  exp lana tions in 7 th and 9 th g rades w hich m eans that school exp lana tions have 
rem ained  too  abstrac t fo r m any students, and they have not been able to in tegrate  school 
and everyday  know ledge. T hese  are the verbalism s w here students do  no t acquire  co n ­
cep ts bu t w ords and rely  on their m em ory no t on th ink ing  (cf. V ygotsky , 1994c). T he 
influence o f  teach ing  on exp lana tions w as also seen in new  them es driven  from  the lately  
studied  topics: one third o f  7 th g raders referred  to ou r geographical position , and clim ate 
zones w hile exp la in ing  the reasons fo r seasonal changes. A lso , o lder studen ts used m ore 
sc ien tific  term s (cf. Sadler, 1987).
In school teachers assess the acquisition  and understand ing  o f  stu d en ts’ know ledge 
m ainly w ith such questions to w hich answ ers are given in the tex tbook  and stressed by
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the teacher, i.e., with factual questions (cf. Vosniadou, 1994). Actually, this verbal ac­
quisition of knowledge is quite illusory.
We could show that using drawings enables to determine this speciousness. The 5th 
graders who gave exact explanations divided into two groups on the basis of their 
drawings (see Figure 5). The illustrations of the first group were exact, i.e., consonant 
with explanations but of the second group aggregate, i.e., inconsonant with explanations. 
The understanding of students in these groups is different. The first group has an inte­
grated conception of the phenomena which is also in accordance with the knowledge 
that had been taught in school. The second group has nonintegrated knowledge: their 
explanations and illustrations stand separately. The fact that the students have not under­
stood the phenomena but only memorized texts is seen from the aggregate nature of their 
drawings.
Aggregate illustrations are based on textbook’s illustrations but usually also contain 
something (some assumptions) of everyday experience and are comparable to synthetic 
models or misconceptions according to Vosniadou (1992, 1994). It is seen from the il­
lustrations that these children have quite a vague idea of the movements of the Earth 
(e.g., Figures 2d-f). They have memorized the verbal explanation “The Earth revolves 
around the Sun” but have not understand its real meaning. Also, in several illustrations 
the idea of fixed up-down direction is expressed. For example, the Sun shines at the top 
as we see it in everyday life but the day/night are shown in the place where they are 
drawn in the textbook (Figure Id, cf. Figure 3). The same idea is expressed on Figure 2e 
while illustrating seasonal changes. According to Vosniadou (1994), it is one of the on­
tological presuppositions children use to construct their initial and synthetic mental as­
tronomical models. The differences between their explanations and illustrations, and 
especially the strange form of illustrations shows that these students do not understand 
phenomena although their verbal explanation is correct.
It is possible that these students will later revert in their explanations to aggregate or 
even descriptive answers. These changes were shown in our longitudinal study 
(unpublished data). The results of the present cross-sectional study also affirm the ten­
dency: in older grades, students gave less exact explanations, but the amount of exact 
illustrations did not grow. Students acquired verbal facts and illustrations separately at 
first, memorizing mainly the verbal school knowledge (as it is usually demanded by the 
teacher) but did not draw their illustrations on the basis of the explanations. Our results 
show that teaching where the stress is on memorizing can give outwardly good results 
shortly after learning the topic in school. Students include new school knowledge (e.g., 
geographical zones) into their answers very easily. But as the teaching does not encour­
age the integration of everyday and school knowledge, students forget the explanations 
and turn back to their everyday explanations again. The results have also shown that 
learning by rote is not the same as achieving understanding.
Exact explanations were mainly accompanied by exact illustrations in 7th and 9th 
grades (see Figure 5). It shows the real understanding of phenomena: these students have 
integrated the school knowledge with their everyday knowledge (Vygotsky, 1994c). At 
present they are able to use different mediational means (verbal explanations and illus­
trations) in a consistent manner.
It seems that asking students to illustrate their explanations is a good method to gain 
a deeper insight into students’ understanding. Another possibility is used by Vosniadou 
et al. (Vosniadou, 1992, 1994; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992, 1994). They asked genera­
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tive questions w hich  con fro n t students w ith phenom ena abou t w hich they do  no t have 
d irec t experience  and abou t w hich they  have no t received  any ex p lic it instruction . A l­
though clin ica l in terv iew s have becom e p o pu lar in assessing  studen ts’ m isconcep tions 
(B ell, 1995) it is p robab ly  too  tim e-consum ing  to use in terview s in usual c lassroom  as­
sessm ent by teachers.
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